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I. Introduction 
“We are the people of Benicia. We have mobilized.”1 As local 
activist Andrés Soto spoke these words, a petition unfurled behind 
him containing the signatures of 4,081 concerned citizens—a 
quarter of them Benicia residents—opposed to the construction of 
a facility that would allow crude oil to be delivered into the town 
by railcar.2 This meeting kicked off three consecutive nights of City 
Council meetings concerning the crude-by-rail project.3 On each 
night, the chambers were packed with concerned residents, 
officials from other cities, and literally buses full of loosely 
organized activists generally opposing the construction the crude 
oil offloading facility.  
Benicia—pronounced “Ben-Ē-sha” by visitors, but “Ben-ISH-
a” by locals—is an idyllic bedroom community located in the 
crowded San Francisco Bay Area. The town was once, perhaps 
surprisingly, one of California’s first capitals.4 Historically, its 
location on the Carquinez Strait made it a perfect location to 
develop ports and nurture California’s nascent industries.5 As the 
“tanning capital of the west” and home to arsenals and shipyards, 
Benicia contributed greatly to California’s economic and military 
development.6 Even as the town’s wartime uses became less 
                                                                                                     
 1. Video of Benicia City Council Continued Regular Meeting (April 4, 2016), 
https://benicia.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=1&clip_id=60&autostart
=0&embed=1 (last visited Feb. 11, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 2. Id.  
 3. See generally Agendas, Minutes, and Videos, CITY OF BENICIA, 
http://www.ci.benicia.ca.us/agendas (last visited Feb. 27, 2017) (containing the 
minutes and video of the April 4, 5, and 6, 2017 Benicia City Council meetings) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 4. See Benicia’s History, VISIT BENICIA, http://www.visitbenicia.org/ 
content/benicias-history (last visited Jan. 9, 2017) (“Just a few years after its 
founding, Benicia was the third site selected to serve as the California state 
capital . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 5. See CITY OF BENICIA, HISTORIC CONTEXT STATEMENT 35 (2010), 
http://ohp.parks.ca.gov/pages/1054/files/benicia%20context%20.pdf [hereinafter 
HISTORIC CONTEXT STATEMENT] (describing shipping and the arsenal’s 
contribution to the choice of Benicia as a state capital).  
 6. See id. at 67–72 (detailing Benicia’s economic contributions in early-
statehood-California).  
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relevant, Benicia continued to evolve, and new industry sustained 
the town.7 Importantly for this Note, in 1966, Benicia successfully 
attracted its largest employer—now known as Valero Refining 
Company.8  
As is often the case, Benicia’s industrial development came 
with an environmental price tag. Increasing awareness of 
environmental issues, like air pollution and climate change, 
resulted in increased scrutiny for the refinery.9 Local entities soon 
formed in opposition to the refinery and stymied any new efforts 
by the refinery to expand.10  
In December 2012, to the dismay of a number of residents, 
Valero submitted a land-use permit application to construct a 
crude offloading facility—a necessity for offloading crude shipped 
in railcars—and expand the refinery’s capacity to receive domestic 
crude oil shipments.11 Currently, Valero receives almost all of its 
crude oil via “marine vessel from Alaska and foreign sources,” 
along with some from California producers.12 With an eye to 
opening up the domestic market, the refinery hoped to construct a 
                                                                                                     
 7. See id. at 158 (listing new industries that took the place of the foreclosed 
arsenal).   
 8. See id. (describing the refinery as the “most important” industrial park 
tenant and stating that the revenues earned by the new refinery “helped stabilize 
Benicia’s economy”).  
 9. See, e.g., Denis Cuff, Valero Refinery Faces $197,500 Fine for Fouling 
Suisun Bay, E. BAY TIMES (Oct. 17, 2016), http://www.eastbaytimes. 
com/2016/10/17/benicia-valero-refinery-faces-197500-for-fouling-suisun-bay/ 
(last updated Oct. 18, 2016) (last visited Jan. 9, 2017) (“State water pollution 
regulators propose to fine the Valero oil refinery $197,500 for discharging more 
than a million gallons of partially treated plant wastewater . . . .”) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review); Valero Refinery in Benicia to Pay $122,500 
in Air Pollution Penalties, E. BAY TIMES (June 25, 2015) 
http://www.eastbaytimes.com/2015/06/25/valero-refinery-in-benicia-to-pay-
122500- in-air-pollution-penalties/ (last updated Aug. 15, 2016) (last visited Jan. 
9, 2017) (“The Valero oil refinery has agreed to pay $122,500 in civil penalties for 
air pollution violations during 2011 . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review).  
 10. See, e.g., Home, BENICIANS FOR A SAFE & HEALTHY COMMUNITY, 
http://www.safebenicia.org (last visited Oct. 14, 2017) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 11. See Valero Refining Co.—Petition for Declaratory Order, FD 36036, slip 
op. at 2 (STB served Sep. 20, 2016) (recapping the events leading up to the 
Declaratory Order).  
 12. Id.   
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crude-by-rail offloading facility capable of receiving two fifty-car 
unit-trains per day.13 
Valero’s proposal to construct the crude offloading facility 
touched off a firestorm in Benicia,14 as well as in California 
generally.15 Valero’s application was fraught with roadblocks, 
ultimately requiring one land-use permit application submission, 
two Environmental Impact Reports, two separate Planning 
Commission denials, and four years.16 In the end, Valero changed 
direction in the face of stiff opposition to its proposal.17 Instead of 
going through the city, Valero attempted to chart a course around 
the local government, completely ousting the city from the 
decision-making process.18 
On May 31, 2016, Valero petitioned the Surface 
Transportation Board (STB), a federal agency, for a Declaratory 
Order clarifying and limiting Benicia’s authority to deny Valero’s 
permit application.19 Valero argued that the Interstate Commerce 
Commission (ICC) Termination Act preempted the City of Benicia 
Planning Commission’s decision removing, or severely limiting, 
the town’s ability to deny these permits as an undue interference 
on railroads.20  
                                                                                                     
 13. Id.  
 14. See Rye Druzin, Valero Decides Not to Sue Benicia Over Crude-by-Rail 
Denial, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS (Dec. 23, 2016), 
http://www.expressnews.com/business/eagle-ford-energy/article/Valero-decides-
not-to-sue-Benicia-over-10816140.php (last visited Jan. 9, 2017) (“The fight over 
the crude-by-rail project opened up rifts in [Benicia] where the Valero refinery is 
a major employer . . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 15. See Tony Bizjak, Crude Oil Train Protests Planned in Sacramento, Davis, 
SACRAMENTO BEE (July 8, 2014), http://www.sacbee.com/news/ 
local/article71926902.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2017) (describing protests across 
California regarding Valero’s crude by aril project) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review).  
 16. See Valero Refining Co., slip op. at 2–3 (recapping the events leading up 
to the Declaratory Order).  
 17. Id.  
 18. Pet. for Declaratory Order, Valero Refining Co., FD 36036 (May 31, 
2016). 
 19. Id.  
 20. See Valero Refining Co., slip op. at 1 (seeking a declaration that “denying 
Valero’s conditional use permit for a crude oil off-loading facility [is] preempted 
by 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b)”).  
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Preemption is a constitutional doctrine drawn from the dictate 
that the “Constitution, and the Laws of the United States . . . [are] 
the supreme Law of the Land . . . .”21 So long as Congress acts under 
an enumerated or implied power, it theoretically has the authority 
to preempt any state or local regulation it sees fit.22 Historically, a 
clear statement from Congress has been required before an act is 
considered preemptive due to preemption’s potentially expansive 
impact and interference with state sovereignty.23  
California communities and industries both weighed in on this 
fight. Refineries and railways asserted that the ICC Termination 
Act preempts local permitting power when the proposed project 
involves the shipment or receipt of crude oil via railcar.24 Whereas 
localities—and the state of California25—asserted that denying use 
permits is well within traditional police powers, particularly the 
power to create regulations impacting public health, safety, and 
welfare.26  
STB jurisdiction encompasses those activities considered 
“transportation” and those “performed by, or under the auspices of, 
                                                                                                     
 21. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.  
 22. See Carter J. Strickland, Jr., Revitalizing the Presumption Against 
Preemption to Prevent Regulatory Gaps: Railroad Deregulation and Waste 
Transfer Stations, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1147, 1151 (2007) [hereinafter Strickland, 
Revitalizing the Presumption] (describing the potential scope of preemption 
doctrine).  
 23. See id. at 1154 (explaining that the presumption against preemption 
“required a clear statement from Congress before the Supreme Court would 
interpret a statute to displace states from regulating in areas in which they 
historically operated”).  
 24. See Pet. for Declaratory Order at 3, Valero Refining Co., FD 36036 (May 
31, 2016).  
Valero maintains that the Planning Commission’s refusal to certify the 
EIR and denial of the land use permit are federally preempted under 
§ 10501(b) because they prevent rail transportation of crude oil to the 
refinery, deny Valero its right to receive rail service, and prevent 
[Union Pacific] from providing such rail service. 
 25. See Letter from Kamala Harris, Att’y Gen., State of California, to Amy 
Million, Principal Planner, City of Benicia (Apr. 14, 2016) (opposing Valero’s 
argument that Benicia was preempted from denying Valero’s conditional use 
permit for construction of a crude oil offloading facility) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 26. See Benicia, Cal., Res. 16-150 (Oct. 13, 2016) (asserting the City’s 
authority over public health, safety, and welfare).  
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a ‘rail carrier.’”27 Yet, the scope of “permissible indirect rail 
regulation” remains unclear.28 In the Valero case, the STB issued 
a surprising decision, holding that the city’s permitting authority 
was not preempted “because the Planning Commissions decision 
[did] not attempt to regulate transportation by ‘rail carrier’” and 
the refinery did not present facts indicating they were operating 
“under the auspices of a rail carrier.”29 This is the only STB 
decision dealing with the precise question and the federal courts 
have yet to take it up.  
After Benicia’s successful rejection of crude-by-rail, multiple 
localities have become emboldened and also denied refinery permit 
applications for the construction of offloading facilities.30 The fruits 
of local activism, both up-rail and down-rail, have hindered crude-
by-rail expansion plans across the West, but refiners, crude oil 
producers, and rail carriers have significant incentive to push 
back.31 As discussed below, there are significant competitive 
advantages and financial incentives for railroads and refineries, 
especially on the West Coast, to import crude via railcar.32 Given 
the high stakes for both localities and corporations, the preemption 
issue is far from settled.   
The question explored in this Note is whether, or perhaps to 
what extent, the ICC Termination Act preempts localities from 
using land-use permitting authority to deny a refinery’s permit 
application for construction of a crude offloading facility. The scope 
                                                                                                     
 27. Valero Refining Co., slip op. at 4.  
 28. Id. at 3.  
 29. Id. at 4.  
 30. See, e.g., Tony Bizjak, Oil Company Dealt Another Blow on Plan to Ship 
Crude by Train, SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct. 6, 2016, 
http://www.sacbee.com/news/local/article106475912.html (last visited Oct. 14, 
2016) (explaining that the San Luis Obispo County Board of Supervisors recently 
denied Phillips 66 a permit to build a crude offloading facility at its refinery) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Donna Beth Weilenman, Council 
Denies Valero Crude-By-Rail Project, BENICIA HERALD, Sep. 22, 2016, 
http://beniciaheraldonline.com/council-denies-valero-crude-by-rail-project/ (last 
visited Oct. 14, 2016) (identifying the Benicia City Council as the first local 
authority to deny a refinery a  permit to construct a crude offloading facility) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 31. See infra Part II.A (discussing the economics of crude-by-rail).  
 32. See infra Part II.A (same).  
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of the ICC Termination Act’s Preemption Clause depends largely 
upon the answer to two questions. First, whether Congress 
intended the ICC Termination Act to cover local regulations, such 
as land-use permits. And second, whether Congress intended 
refineries to be among the covered parties under the Act. To 
analyze these questions, this Note investigates how the ICC 
Termination Act’s textual definitions, legislative intent, and 
judicial application combine to create an unclear mandate that 
could threaten local control over matters of genuine local import.  
This Note proceeds in the following course: Part II explores 
refiner and producer motives to expand crude-by-rail into the 
Western market.33 The California market creates significant 
incentives and opportunities for crude producers, refiners, and 
railroad companies, but it also poses political risks and structural 
challenges. Part III evaluates the ICC Termination Act’s language 
and the relevant legislative history.34 This history demonstrates 
that, in an attempt to deregulate the railroad industry, Congress 
sought to draft a preemption clause that covered all “economic 
regulation,” but with room for preservation of some traditional 
local police powers. Part IV evaluates the broad, and sometimes 
incongruous, application of the ICC Termination Act in federal 
courts and the STB.35 Lastly, using the text, legislative history, 
and jurisprudence as a guide, Part V argues that under no 
circumstances should a refinery be considered a “rail carrier,” and 
therefore, the ICC Termination Act should not preempt local 
zoning laws impacting refineries.36 Ultimately, this Note counsels 
against a broad reading of ICC Termination Act preemption. Any 
preemptive result would dangerously threaten local autonomy and 
open every community in the United States to crude-by-rail 
delivery, no matter the concerns of the local government and the 
people. 
                                                                                                     
 33. See infra Part II (providing an overview of the economic justification for 
crude-by-rail on the West Coast).  
 34. See infra Part III (exploring the legislative history of the ICC 
Termination Act).  
 35. See infra Part IV (evaluating the judicial application of the ICC 
Termination Act).  
 36. See infra Part V (concluding that the ICC Termination Act Preemption 
Clause should not apply to crude-by-rail offloading facilities).  
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II. Crude-by-Rail: The Most Economically and Competitively 
Feasible Method of Domestic Crude Shipment to the West 
To understand why crude-by-rail is important to domestic oil 
producers, oil refiners, and the railroad industry, it is important to 
understand the economic and strategic incentives for expanding 
and developing crude-by-rail facilities. As discussed below, oil 
production is increasing in the United States, yet there are few 
shipment methods available for domestic oil producers seeking to 
market their product on the West Coast. While crude-by-rail is the 
one economically feasible strategy to ship the crude, it is politically 
difficult. Nonetheless, moneyed interests have significant 
incentives to move crude from domestic producers to Western 
refiners and pursue the fight in the courts.   
A. Oil Production and Transportation in the United States 
In the United States, domestic crude oil production is 
increasing at a dramatic rate.37 Currently, domestic crude oil 
production—at 9.4 million barrels per day—is rapidly approaching 
its historic peak—9.6 million barrels per day.38 A significant 
portion of the increased production is due to North Dakota’s 
booming crude oil industry centered in the Bakken Shale 
Formation.39 Additionally, crude oil production has increased in 
areas such as the Eagle Ford Group in Texas, the Marcellus 
Formation in Pennsylvania and Ohio, and the Niobrara Formation 
in Wyoming.40  
                                                                                                     
 37. See ASS’N OF AM. R.RS., U.S. RAIL CRUDE OIL TRAFFIC 1 (2015) 
https://www.aar.org/BackgroundPapers/US%20Rail%20Crude%20Oil%20Traffic
.pdf [hereinafter AAR, CRUDE OIL TRAFFIC] (indicating that U.S. crude production 
increased from 5.0 million barrels per day in 2008 to 9.4 million barrels per day 
in 2015). 
 38. See id. (displaying historical data regarding historic levels of U.S. crude 
oil production). 
 39. See id. at 2 (demonstrating that production of crude oil in North Dakota 
rose by 982% in 12 years to 1.2 million barrels per day). 
 40. See id. at 1 (listing the locations of large shale deposits in the contiguous 
United States).   
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Transportation of crude oil by railroad is a relatively recent 
phenomenon. The practice’s popularity peaked in 2014 when it was 
used to transport 382 million barrels of crude within the United 
States.41 Today, crude-by-rail moves 319 million barrels of crude 
per year42—most frequently between North Dakota producers and 
refineries on the East Coast.43  
Crude oil must be processed at refineries in order to be made 
useful as gasoline, jet fuel, asphalt, or a litany of other 
byproducts.44 Ideally, these refineries should be located near water 
for two important reasons: (1) water is used in the refining 
process,45 and (2) nearby ports make importing crude and 
exporting refined oil easier.46 Midwestern geography and 
infrastructure make the region inadequate to refine the massive 
amounts of oil produced in North Dakota.47 Therefore, crude 
producers in the Bakken must outsource refinement to any of three 
destinations better suited for these requirements—the Gulf Coast, 
                                                                                                     
 41. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., MOVEMENTS OF CRUDE OIL AND SELECTED 
PRODUCTS BY RAIL (2016), http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/ 
pet_move_railNA_a_EPC0_RAIL_mbbl_a.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2017) 
(displaying data regarding the amount of crude transported via railroad between 
each Petroleum Administration for Defense District) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. See AAR, CRUDE OIL TRAFFIC, supra note 37, at 3 (“Crude oil has little 
value unless it can be transported to refineries . . . .”).  
 45. See Eve Troeh, An Oil Refinery Secures an Essential Material: Water, 
MARKETPLACE (Aug. 21, 2012), https://www.marketplace.org/2012/08/21/ 
sustainability/oil-refinery-secures-essential-material-water (last visited Jan. 7, 
2017) (“To turn crude oil into car-ready gas, you need a lot of water.”) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review).   
 46. See Daniel Gross, The Great Oil Refinery Shortage, SLATE (June 8, 2004), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2004/06/the_great_refinery_sh
ortage.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2017) (explaining the various reasons oil is often 
produced near the coast) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 47. See Rail Transportation Today, AM. PETROLEUM INST., 
http://www.api.org/oil-and-natural-gas/wells-to-consumer/transporting-oil-
natural-gas/rail-transportation/rail-transportation-today (last visited Jan. 9, 
2017) (“Because of [the Bakken’s] geographic location and lack of energy 
infrastructure, operators have been transporting crude oil from production areas 
to refineries by rail.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
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the East Coast, or the West Coast.48 Crude producers, however, 
have extraordinarily limited access to the West.  
B. The Size of the California Crude Oil Market Provides 
Significant Incentives and Opportunity for Investment 
The Western states, while ideal for refineries, are not readily 
accessible to domestic crude oil producers, especially compared to 
the Southern and Eastern states. Although pipelines are by far the 
nation’s most heavily utilized transportation method for crude 
oil,49 very few pipelines lead to Western states.50 Therefore, 
Western states like California are heavily reliant on foreign crude 
oil shipments.51 In an effort to expand the domestic crude oil 
market in the West, producers, railroads, and refiners are 
attempting to exploit crude-by-rail.52 Although “[r]ail is a relatively 
high-cost method of transportation,”53 a unique confluence of 
circumstances make crude-by-rail a compelling option for 
producers seeking to  reach the California, Oregon, and 
Washington markets.  
                                                                                                     
 48. See AAR, CRUDE OIL TRAFFIC, supra note 37, at 3 (“[M]ost U.S. refineries 
are located in traditional crude oil production areas (Texas, Oklahoma, Louisiana) 
or on the coasts . . . rather than near new production areas like North Dakota.”).  
 49. See John Frittelli et al., U.S. Rail Transportation of Crude Oil: 
Background Issues for Congress, in TRANSPORTING CRUDE OIL BY RAIL 1, 4 (Rosario 
S. McLaughlin ed., 2014) [hereinafter Frittelli, U.S. Transportation of Crude Oil] 
(“[P]ipelines and oceangoing tankers have delivered the vast majority of crude to 
U.S. refineries, accounting for approximately 93% of total receipts . . . .”).  
 50. One need only view a map of crude pipelines on the West Coast to see the 
infrastructure’s insufficiency. See Where Are Liquids Pipelines Located?, 
PIPELINES 101, http://www.pipeline101.com/where-are-pipelines-located (last 
visited Jan. 9, 2017) (displaying a map of crude oil pipelines in the United States) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 51. See W. STATES PETROLEUM ASS’N, OIL AND GAS IN CALIFORNIA: THE 
INDUSTRY AND ITS ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTION IN 2012 6 (2014), 
https://www.wspa.org/sites/default/files/uploads/O%26G_Contribution_20140418
.pdf (estimating that California imports 50.7% of crude oil supply from foreign 
sources).  
 52. See Rail Transportation Today, AM. PETROLEUM INST., supra note 47 
(“Domestic deliveries from shale plays to West Coast refineries have also offset 
declining production in California and Alaska.”).  
 53. Frittelli, U.S. Transportation of Crude Oil, supra note 49, at 6.  
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The most important factor driving crude producers to reach 
the Western states is opportunity, specifically the opportunity to 
capitalize on the California market. The most recent U.S. Energy 
Information Administration (EIA) estimates show California 
consuming nearly 630 million barrels of petroleum per year.54 This 
makes California one of the largest consumers of such products on 
the planet.55 Yet, of the 163,600 train shipments of crude 
originating in North Dakota in 2012, only 2,000 shipments (1%) 
were sent to California.56 Again, this enables domestic California 
oil producers and foreign producers to dominate the California 
crude market.57  
Beyond the size of the market, other factors help justify the 
use of crude-by-rail in the West. First, Bakken crude oil sells for 
$4 to $28 less per barrel than other crude oil.58 Although rail 
transportation costs are approximately $5 to $10 higher than 
pipeline transportation,59 the lower cost of Bakken crude allows 
refiners to recoup the higher transportation costs.  
                                                                                                     
 54. Total Petroleum Consumption Estimates, 2014, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. 
https://www.eia.gov/state/seds/data.cfm?incfile=/state/seds/sep_fuel/html/fuel_us
e_pa.html&sid=US&sid=CA (last visited Oct. 14, 2016) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 55. See Pet. for Declaratory Order at 8, Valero Refining Co., FD 36036 (May 
31, 2016) (identifying California as one of the largest consumers of gasoline “in 
the world”); International Energy Statistics, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
http://www.eia.gov/beta/international/data/browser/#/?pa=0000001&c=ruvvvvvfv
tvnvv1urvvvvfvvvvvvfvvvou20evvvvvvvvvnvvuvo&ct=0&tl_id=5-A&vs=INTL.5-
2-AFG-TBPD.A&ord=SA&vo=0&v=H&start=2013&end=2014 (last visited Jan. 
7, 2017) (comparing the annual petroleum consumption of different countries) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 56. US Gov’t Accountability Office, Oil and Gas Transportation: Department 
of Transportation Is Taking Action to Address Rail Safety, but Additional Actions 
Are Needed to Improve Pipeline Safety, in OIL AND GAS TRANSPORTATION: PIPELINE 
AND RAIL INFRASTRUCTURE SERIES 1, 30 Figure 7 (Elton Simmons ed., 2015) 
[hereinafter GAO, Oil and Gas Transportation].  
 57. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (providing an overview of 
California’s oil importation).  
 58. See Frittelli, U.S. Transportation of Crude Oil, supra note 49, at 6 
(evaluating the economic incentives for using crude-by-rail).  
 59. See id. at 8 (“Railroad transport costs in the neighborhood of $10 to $15 
per barrel compared to $5 per barrel for pipeline.”).  
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Railroads also offer producers and refiners significant 
flexibility.60 It is exceedingly difficult to construct new refining 
facilities61 and exceedingly expensive to construct new pipelines.62 
Railroads are administratively more efficient to build than 
pipelines and cost less to construct.63 Additionally, the national 
railroad infrastructure vastly exceeds pipeline infrastructure.64 
While there are 57,000 miles of crude oil pipelines,65 there are 
140,000 miles of railroad track, enough for U.S. tracks to circle the 
earth nearly six times.66 Other factors making railroads 
competitive, despite the increased cost, include higher quality 
transportation, shorter contract terms than pipeline 
transportation (ten to fifteen years shorter), and shorter overall 
transportation timelines (five to seven days compared to forty 
days).67 
                                                                                                     
 60. See id. at 7 (“Railroads are a viable alternative to pipeline transportation 
largely because they offer greater flexibility.”).  
 61. See id. at 4 (“The last entirely new petroleum refinery in the United 
States opened in 1976.”).  
 62. See id. at 4–5 (discussing the cost of constructing pipelines compared to 
the cost of building railroads).  
 63. See id. at 7 (“Railroads can increase capacity relatively cheaply and 
quickly by upgrading tracks . . . [and] do not require approval to make 
improvements of existing lines.”).  
 64. See Tim Meko, Six Maps that Show the Anatomy of America’s Vast 
Infrastructure, WASH. POST (Dec. 1, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/national/maps-of-american-
infrastrucure/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2017) (visualizing America’s pipeline and 
railroad infrastructure) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 65. Frittelli, U.S. Transportation of Crude Oil, supra note 49, at 7.  
 66. See ASS’N OF AM. R.RS., TOTAL 2013 ANNUAL SPENDING (2013), 
https://www.aar.org/Infographics/Economic/High%20Resolution%20Images/AAR
_Spending_Infographic.pdf (“Railroads own 140,000 miles of track, enough to 
circle the earth 5.6 times.”).  
 67. See Frittelli, U.S. Transportation of Crude Oil, supra note 49, at 8–9 
(expanding of the advantages of rail transportation of crude, as opposed to 
pipeline).  
CAN LOCALITIES STOP CRUDE-BY-RAIL? 159 
C. The West Lacks Both the Political and Structural Capacity 
Necessary to Accommodate Crude-by-Rail Shipments 
For the above reasons, refineries consider rail carriage the 
only economically and competitively feasible method to ship crude 
oil from Midwestern producers to Western refiners.68 Even so, the 
West Coast lacks the structural capacity (i.e., offloading facilities) 
and the political will (i.e., many communities, like Benicia, do not 
want them) to allow crude-by-rail to take hold as an effective 
transportation modality.69  
As discussed, local refiners lack offloading equipment, causing 
a significant impediment to the expansion of crude-by-rail.70 This 
offloading equipment is necessary to transfer crude oil from the 
tank cars to the refinery for processing.71 Currently, refineries and 
producers alone have borne the cost of construction of these 
offloading facilities, not the railroads.72 Railroad companies’ 
hands-off approach strengthens the hand of local activists, as it is 
more difficult for refineries than railroad companies to argue for 
                                                                                                     
 68. See Valero Refining Co.—Petition for Declaratory Order, FD 36036, slip 
op. at 2 (describing the Bakken crude as “economically and competitively” 
accessible to California only by rail).  
 69. Crude-by-rail offloading facilities were recently considered or are 
currently pending at Valero Refinery, in Benicia, CA; Alon Bakersfield Refinery, 
in Kern County, CA; Phillips 66 Refinery, San Luis Obispo, CA; Shell Oil Puget 
Sound, in Skagit, WA; Tesoro Savage Vancouver Refinery, in Vancouver, WA; and 
Buckeye Terminal, in West Sacramento, CA. Pet. For Declaratory Order at 3–7, 
Valero Refining Co., FD 36036 (May 31, 2016).  
 70. See Frittelli, U.S. Transportation of Crude Oil, supra note 49, at 9 (“One 
hindrance to the expansion of crude-by-rail has been the lack of tank cars and 
loading and unloading infrastructure.”).  
 71. Construction of these offloading sites often involves: (1) construction of 
the offloading rack, (2) installation of a floating-roof-tank to store the crude, (3) 
installation of additional track and rail spurs, and (4) construction of additional 
pipeline to transport the crude from the offloading facility to the refinery. See 
Land Use Permit Application Crude-by-rail Project, Valero Benicia Refinery at 1 
(Dec. 2012) (supplying an overview of the permit request).  
 72. See Frittelli, U.S. Transportation of Crude Oil, supra note 49, at 9 
(“[I]nvestment is being made by the oil industry or by rail equipment leasing 
companies, not railroads.”).  
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preemption.73 Thus, as local refineries apply for permits to build 
these facilities, localities are successfully denying their requests.74  
Crude-by-rail also faces significant political opposition in 
Western states. California in particular is reticent to support any 
industry that may impact carbon emissions, like transportation 
and crude oil production.75 Moreover, recent derailments resulting 
in death and environmental destruction, though rare, weigh 
heavily on localities’ minds when considering the land-use permits 
for offloading facilities.76 Some activists have even gone so far as 
to draft “blast zone” maps that predict the effects of a train 
explosion on local communities considering the construction of 
facilities required for crude-by-rail transportation.77 Whether 
these localities have the authority to deny these permits is a more 
complicated question, and is the main focus of this Note.  
III. ICC Termination Act: A Legislative History 
The question of whether the ICC Termination Act preempts 
local authority over traditional land-use permitting in situations 
like the one presented in this Note makes more sense when the Act 
is placed in its historical context. To understand the Act’s intended 
preemptive effect, the long history of railroad over-regulation must 
be taken into account. Ultimately, the ICC Termination Act arises 
out of this history as the capstone of a larger deregulatory effort 
                                                                                                     
 73. See supra Part V.B (arguing that refineries should be unable to receive 
the preemptive protections of the ICC Termination Act).  
 74. See supra note 30 (discussing recent instances of permit denials).  
 75. See Assembly Bill 32 Overview, CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/ab32/ab32.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2017) (reviewing 
the features of the California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006); see also 
GAO, Oil and Gas Transportation, supra note 56, at 17–18 (discussing risks to 
local air quality).  
 76. See GAO, Oil and Gas Transportation, supra note 56, at 18–19 (providing 
details about crude-by-rail derailments occurring between 2013 and 2014 in Lac 
Mégantic, Quebec; Gianford, Alberta; Aliceville, Alabama; Casselton, North 
Dakota; Plaster Rock, New Brunswick; and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania).  
 77. See, e.g., NAT’L RES. DEF. COUNCIL, CRUDE OIL TRAIN DERAILMENT RISK 
ZONES IN BENICIA, CA (2014) https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/ca-crude-oil-
by-rail-Benicia.pdf. (diagraming the neighborhoods and schools endangered by a 
crude-by-rail explosion in Benicia).  
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that includes a number of other laws. The Act’s Preemption 
Clause, viewed in the light of “total economic deregulation,” takes 
on more force than might otherwise be presumed by the text alone.  
The ICC Termination Act is a comprehensive regulatory 
statute, made especially relevant because the STB operates by 
terms prescribed therein.78 To understand the ICC Termination 
Act’s full significance, it is important to understand the context in 
which the Act arose. 
A. Pendular Railroad Regulations: From Highly Permissive, to 
Highly Restrictive, and Back Again 
Prior to 1870, Congress intended most laws regarding 
railroads to encourage their establishment and success.79 But, as 
the railroads gained a foothold—eventually becoming massively 
successful commercial enterprises80—they began to leverage their 
market share and wield coercive market power over their 
consumers and the towns in which they operated.81 Railroads’ 
market dominance profoundly affected many freight customers.82 
Anticompetitive behavior caused significant antagonism between 
“eastern financial interests” and the rural communities in which 
the railroads operated, and contributed to railroad companies’ 
increasingly negative image.83 Freight customers and local 
                                                                                                     
 78. See infra Part III.B (reviewing the relevant provisions of the ICC 
Termination Act).  
 79. See JAMES W. ELY, JR., RAILROADS AND AMERICAN LAW 71 (2002) 
(examining the railroad regulatory landscape in the nineteenth century).  
 80. See James W. Ely, Jr., “The Railroad System Has Burst Through State 
Limits”: Railroads and Interstate Commerce, 1830–1920, 55 ARK. L. REV. 933, 933 
[hereinafter Ely, Railroads and Interstate Commerce] (describing the railroads as 
“America’s first big business”).  
 81. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-311, at 90 (1995), as reprinted in 1995 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 164, 802 (“Because railroads possess certain characteristics of 
natural monopolies, in the absence of competition from other modes of 
transportation, railroads were able to wield enormous power over the shippers 
and communities they served.”).  
 82. See id. at 91 (“[S]ome shippers and communities continue to be 
dependent upon a single rail carrier and may not have access to alternative modes 
of transportation . . . .”).  
 83. Id. at 90.   
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communities raised a litany of complaints against the railroads, 
but the railroads’ high and regularly fluctuating shipping rates 
were of particular concern.84 Ultimately, these complaints were too 
vociferous and persistent for local governments to ignore.85  
In response to these concerns, states passed a patchwork of 
laws attempting to reel in the rail industry’s abuses.86 Starting in 
the 1870s, various Midwestern states passed “Granger Laws,” the 
first of many laws regulating the railroad industry.87 Generally, 
this patchwork of state regulations required railroads to charge 
uniform rates for carriage—addressing freight shippers’ largest 
complaint.88 
As the public began to recognize the danger railroads posed to 
surrounding communities,89 localities began to enact more and 
more punitive regulations. For example, while farmers had no 
recourse at common law when trains killed animals wandering 
onto the tracks,90 states passed Railroad Fence laws to impose 
liability on railroads for these losses.91 States also passed laws 
regulating railroad crossing and safety92 and laws enumerating 
railroad passenger rights.93 Increasing state regulation, however, 
began to have a negative financial impact on the railroads.94  
                                                                                                     
 84. ELY, supra note 79, at 82–83.  
 85. See id. at 71 (“Although questions of safety and service were important, 
unhappiness with rates was the principal force behind the push for more vigorous 
railroad regulation.”).  
 86. See id. at 86–87 (listing the various states that passed Granger Laws and 
their impacts). 
 87. See id. (same).  
 88. See id. at 81 (“The chronic complaint against the carriers, therefore, was 
not exorbitant charges but unequal treatment of shippers and communities.”).  
 89. See id. at 117 (“Locomotives killed livestock, started fires, and collided 
with vehicles at highway intersections.”).  
 90. See id. at 118 (“In short, under common law, owners allowed livestock to 
wander at their peril and had no recourse if the animals were killed on the 
tracks.”). 
 91. See id. at 117–19 (recounting litigation regarding Railroad Fence laws).  
 92. See id. at 126 (describing laws requiring railroads to ring bells and give 
warning at crossings or be subject to liability for harm to individuals).  
 93. See id. at 132–33 (describing efforts to encourage railroads to stick to 
schedules and deal with passengers fairly).  
 94. See Ely, Railroads and Interstate Commerce, supra note 80, at 942 (2003) 
(“[S]tate regulations ‘had contributed significantly to the railroads’ financial 
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The railroads’ unpopularity also made them an easy target for 
congressional action. The federal government, recognizing the 
administrative difficulty of myriad state regulations on railroads, 
began to preempt local laws and establish uniform railroad 
regulation.95 In 1887, Congress passed the Inter-State Commerce 
Act (ICA).96 The ICA’s most important provision established the 
ICC, which had “full control over interstate railroad charges”97 and 
power to approve or disapprove railroad mergers and 
acquisitions.98 Additionally, Congress passed the Railway Labor 
Act which, in an effort to “promote the peaceful resolution of rail 
labor conflicts,”99 guaranteed the “right of [railroad] workers to 
organize without employer interference.”100 Congress also enacted 
the Transportation Act of 1940, making the rail industry the first 
industry required to guarantee income to displaced workers.101  
 The simultaneous operation of federal regulations and 
those state regulations not fully preempted by federal law caused 
significant uncertainty and inefficiency.102 By the 1970s, these 
regulations’ cumulative effects resulted in a weakened and 
uncompetitive railroad industry.103 Ultimately, seven major 
railroads and multiple other companies descended into 
                                                                                                     
troubles.’” (quoting HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836–
1937 137 (1991))).  
 95. See id. at 962 (“Congress in the first two decades of the twentieth century 
enacted a comprehensive scheme of federal railroad regulation, one consequence 
was increased displacement of state regulatory authority over the rail industry.”).  
 96. See ELY, supra note 79, at 91 (providing information regarding the 
passage of the ICA).  
 97. Ely, Railroads and Interstate Commerce, supra note 80, at 967.  
 98. See ELY, supra note 79, at 91–92 (describing the establishment and 
authority of the ICC).  
 99. Id. at 258.  
 100. Id. at 259.  
 101. See id. at 263 (stating that the Transportation Act “directed the ICC to 
include compensatory wage payments for four years in any merger approvals”). 
 102. See Ely, Railroads and Interstate Commerce, supra note 80, at 967 (“This 
regulatory confusion clearly burdened the railroads as instruments of interstate 
commerce.”).  
 103. See Strickland, Revitalizing the Presumption, supra note 22, at 1159–60 
(detailing the precipitating events which led to the passage of the ICC 
Termination Act). 
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bankruptcy.104 This crisis even brought a rare moment of 
bipartisan agreement between the major political parties, 
President Jimmy Carter, and then-candidate Ronald Reagan.105 
All agreed that the railroad industry was in dire need of 
deregulation.106  
In one of its first forays into deregulation, Congress enacted 
the Staggers Rail Act of 1980 (Staggers Act).107 The Staggers Act 
deregulated most railroad rates, legalized previously illegal 
railroad shipping contracts, and simplified abandonment 
proceedings.108 According to the ICC Termination Act’s drafters, 
the Staggers Act “stimulated an explosion of service and marketing 
alternatives that would not have been possible under the 
Kafkaesque regulatory regime of the pre-Staggers era.”109 But the 
Staggers Act was only the first step in a larger effort to deregulate 
the railroad industry.  
Concerns over bloated government and the growing regulatory 
state put pressure on Congress and multiple Presidents to 
deregulate the transportation industry.110 In his January 1995 
State of the Union address, President William J. Clinton called on 
Congress to continue its deregulatory efforts specifically, by 
terminating the ICC.111 The waste represented by the ICC was so 
                                                                                                     
 104. Id.   
 105. See S. REP. NO. 104-176, at 3 (1995) (“In 1977, citing the ineffectiveness 
of the ICC, President Carter created a task force that was charged with 
streamlining the ICC and reducing regulation.”). 
 106. Id.   
 107. See Strickland, Revitalizing the Presumption, supra note 22, at 1160 
(providing that Congress enacted “deregulatory reforms designed to lower rates 
and to loosen market exit and entrance restrictions”).   
 108. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-311, at 91 (1995), as reprinted in 1995 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 803 (enumerating the goals and provisions of the Staggers Rail 
Act).  
 109. Id.  
 110. See U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., MOVING AMERICA NEW DIRECTIONS, NEW 
OPPORTUNITIES: A STATEMENT OF NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION POLICY STRATEGIES 
FOR ACTION (1990) 6 (“Economic regulation of trucking and other transportation 
industries should be eliminated where regulation is unnecessary and 
outmoded.”).  
 111. See Statement on Signing the ICC Termination Act of 1995 H.R. 2539, 
32 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1 (Dec. 29, 1995) [hereinafter Signing Statement] 
(stating that the President had called on Congress to eliminate the ICC and 
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absurd to the administration that it was one of two departments—
alongside the Helium Reserve Program—to be comically paired as 
examples of “programs we do not need.”112 The line received 
bipartisan applause, and even a few shouts.113 Congress quickly 
heeded the President’s call by passing the ICC Termination Act.114  
B. The ICC Termination Act of 1995 
Congress viewed the ICC Termination Act as a natural 
extension of the Staggers Act and “the final chapter on 
deregulation.”115 The drafters in the House held the Staggers Act 
in high regard, considering it an important piece of legislation that 
was essential to save the dying railroad industry.116 The House 
Report even described the Staggers Act as producing a 
“renaissance in the railroad industry,”117 one which the House 
hoped to propel forward with the ICC Termination Act.  
True to its name, one of the ICC Termination Act’s main 
purposes was to dismantle the ICC.118 In the initial draft of the Act, 
                                                                                                     
further reduce “unnecessary regulations” in the State of the Union address).  
 112. See State of the Union Address (January 24, 1995), MILLER CTR., U. VA., 
http://millercenter.org/president/clinton/speeches/speech-3440 (last visited 
Nov. 28, 2016) (“We propose to cut $130 billion in spending by shrinking 
departments . . . [and] getting rid of over 100 programs we do not need, like the 
Interstate Commerce Commission and the Helium Reserve Program.”) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 113. See clintonlibrary42, The 1995 State of the Union (Address to a Joint 
Session of the Congress), YOUTUBE (Apr. 11, 2012), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7hSBtgugeUk (last visited Nov. 28, 2016) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 114. See generally Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act of 
1995, 49 U.S.C. §§ 10101–16106 (2012).  
 115. See Disposition of the Railroad Authority of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission Before the Subcomm. on R.Rs. of the H. Comm. on Transp. and 
Infrastructure, 104th Cong. 6 (1995) [hereinafter Disposition of Railroad 
Authority of the I.C.C.] (statement of Frank E. Kruesi, Assistant Secretary for 
Transportation Policy, U.S. Department of Transportation).  
 116. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-311, at 90, as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
802 (listing a number of measures Congress took to “salvage” the railroad 
industry).  
 117. Id. at 90–91, as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 802–03.  
 118. See Overview of the STB, SURFACE TRANSP. BOARD, 
https://www.stb.gov/stb/about/overview.html (last visited Nov. 28, 2016) 
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the House of Representatives did not replace the ICC with any 
particular body, but rather retained the Transportation 
Adjudication Panel  to resolve disputes.119 However, during 
conference, Congress decided to create a replacement body for the 
ICC: the Surface Transportation Board, then housed in the 
Department of Transportation (DOT).120 Ironically, in 2015, the STB 
was elevated to an independent federal agency, much like the 
ICC.121 
Beyond simply paring down a top-heavy federal agency, the ICC 
Termination Act continued the overhaul of federal regulation of 
transportation systems generally.122 One of the ICC Termination 
Act’s main functions was retooling the economic regulation of 
railroads in the United States;123 however, the Act also addressed 
the regulation of transportation by motor carriers124 and 
pipelines.125  
The Act’s railroad-specific provisions address a number of 
regulatory issues. For example, the Act frees railroads to set their 
                                                                                                     
(“Created on January 1, 1996 by the ICC Termination Act of 1995, the Board is 
the successor to the former Interstate Commerce Commission . . . .”) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 119. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-422, at 230 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 
1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 164, 915 (“Section 701 delineates the organizational powers of 
the Transportation Adjudication Panel, including legal representation and budget 
matters.”).  
 120. See id. at 231, as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 916 (“The Conference 
adopts a compromise provision. A three-member Surface Transportation Board is 
established within the Department of Transportation.”).  
 121. See Overview of the STB, SURFACE TRANSP. BD., 
https://www.stb.gov/stb/about/overview.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2017) (“The 
STB Reauthorization Act of 2015 established the STB as a wholly independent 
federal agency on December 18, 2015.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 122. See Strickland, Revitalizing the Presumption, supra note 22, at 1160 
(“[The] ICCTA substantially overhauled the Interstate Commerce Act and the 
economic regulation of rail transportation . . . .”).  
 123. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 10101(1)–(15) (2012) (listing the enacted rail 
transportation policy relating to railroad industry regulation). 
 124. See id. § 13501 (“The Secretary and the Board have jurisdiction, as 
specified in this part, over transportation by motor carrier and the procurement 
of that transportation . . . .”)  
 125. See id. § 15301 (“The Board has jurisdiction over transportation by 
pipeline . . . .”)  
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own rates,126 exempts the railroad industry from traditional 
antitrust enforcement and review,127 and contains provisions 
removing barriers to competitive operation of railroads.128  
C. The ICC Termination Act Preemption Clause 
Most importantly for the purposes of this Note, the Act also 
grants “exclusive” jurisdiction to the STB over regulation of 
transportation by rail carriers and preempts conflicting 
regulations.129  
Specifically, the ICC Termination Act contains a statement of 
general jurisdiction, codified at 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b) (the 
Preemption Clause). This jurisdictional statement provides that 
the Surface Transportation Board’s jurisdiction over:  
(1) transportation by rail carriers, and the remedies 
provided in this part with respect to rates, classification, 
rules (including car service, interchange, and other 
operation rules), practices, routes, services and facilities 
of such carriers; and  
(2) the construction, acquisition, operation, abandonment, 
or discontinuance of spur, industrial, team, switching or 
side tracks, or facilities, even if the tracks are located, or 
intended to be located, entirely in one State,  
is exclusive. Except as otherwise provided in this part, the 
remedies provided under this part with respect to 
regulation of rail transportation are exclusive and 
preempt the remedies provided under Federal or State 
law.130  
To understand the Preemption Clause’s reach, it is important 
to define the terms “transportation” and “rail carrier,” as well as to 
                                                                                                     
 126. See id. § 10701 (providing standards, rules, and practices for rate 
setting).  
 127. See id. § 10706 (exempting the railroad industry from traditional 
application of antitrust laws).  
 128. See, e.g., id. § 11121 (creating standards for efficient use of and service 
by rail cars).  
 129. See id. § 10501(b) (describing the STB’s jurisdiction of railroads).  
 130. Id. (emphasis added).  
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assess their scope when used together. Per the Act, 
“transportation” includes: (a) “locomotive, car, . . . property, 
facility, instrumentality, or equipment of any kind related to the 
movement of passengers or property;” and (b) “services related to 
that movement,” including receipt, delivery, and handling of the 
property being transported.131 The crude offloading rack likely 
constitutes “equipment . . . related to the movement 
of . . . property,” as its sole purpose is to offload rail freight. 
Therefore, it should be considered “transportation” under the Act.  
The definition of “rail carrier” is slightly more fraught. While 
potentially expansive, it has never been applied to its maximum 
breadth.132 Per the Act, “rail carrier” is defined as “a person 
providing common carrier railroad transportation for 
compensation.”133 A “person” can be an “assignee or personal 
representative” of a rail carrier,134 whereas the definition of 
“railroad” includes “intermodal equipment used by or in connection 
with” rail transportation or a facility “used or necessary for 
transportation.”135 This definition is potentially quite broad. While 
a refinery seems not to be a “rail carrier” at first blush, it very well 
could be “a [personal representative] providing common carrier 
[intermodal equipment used in rail transportation] for 
compensation.”  
D. The Preemption Clause’s Application to Refineries’ Crude 
Offloading Rack Building Permits 
“[S]tates cannot regulate matters that the [STB] can, and, 
conversely, . . . states are free to regulate matters that the [STB] 
cannot.”136 Therefore, as an initial matter, crude-by-rail offloading 
facilities at refineries must properly fall within the definition of 
“transportation” and “rail carrier” in order to fall under STB 
                                                                                                     
 131. Id. §§ 10102(9)(A)–(B).  
 132. See infra Part IV.C (providing an overview of the use of the term “rail 
carrier” in case law).  
 133. Id. § 10102(5) (emphasis added).  
 134. Id. § 10102(4). 
 135. Id. §§ 10102(6)(A), (C).  
 136. Strickland, Revitalizing the Presumption, supra note 22, at 1165.  
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jurisdiction and benefit from preemption.137 A cold, textual reading 
of these definitions demonstrates their breadth and weighs in favor 
of preemption.  
The first inquiry is whether crude offloading facilities meet the 
Act’s definition of “transportation.” Refinery crude offloading sites 
facilitate the removal of crude oil from tank cars.138 Once offloaded 
from the cars, the oil is transferred to a pipeline that moves the oil 
a relatively short distance to the refinery.139 These offloading 
facilities consist of steel racks, approximately twenty-three feet in 
height, connected by a cross-track walkway.140 Generally, these 
racks are placed on parallel rail spurs and capable of offloading 
two tank cars simultaneously.141 As discussed, this process seems 
to fall well within the Act’s definition of transportation as it is a 
“service[] related to” the receipt of freight by railcar.142 Without the 
crude offloading facility, a refinery cannot transfer freight from the 
tank car to the refinery.  
Second, the Preemption Clause is only applicable if the 
transportation—in this case offloading—is “by rail carrier.”143 If a 
refinery does not qualify as a “rail carrier,” or service or facility of 
such a carrier, under the Preemption Clause, then the ICC 
Termination Act alone can not preempt a city’s denial of a 
refinery’s land-use permit as the STB would have no 
jurisdiction.144 Read broadly, a crude offloading facility run by a 
“personal representative” of a railroad might fall under the 
Preemption Clause. As discussed later in this Note, this broad 
                                                                                                     
 137. See supra Part III.C (providing the requirements for ICCTA application).  
 138. See generally VALERO REFINING CO., VALERO CRUDE BY RAIL PROJECT 
DESCRIPTION (2013), http://www.ci.benicia.ca.us/vertical/Sites/%7B3436CBED-
6A58-4FEF-BFDF-5F9331215932%7D/uploads/Valero_CBR_Project_ 
Description.pdf (describing the construction process and uses for a crude 
offloading facility). 
 139. See id. at 12 (“Two pumps, operating in parallel, would pump the crude 
oil from the unloading rack header via a new 16-inch pipeline to [a tank].”).   
 140. See id. at 7 (describing the crude offloading rack).  
 141. Id.  
 142. See infra Part III.D (applying the ICC Termination Act definition of 
“transportation” the crude offloading rack).  
 143. 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b)(1).  
 144. See id. § 10501(b) (describing the STB’s jurisdiction).  
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reading has little basis in the legislative history and is not 
supported by the case law.145  
Ultimately, the text alone is not enough to determine whether, 
or under what circumstances, a refinery petitioning to build a 
crude offloading facility could be considered “transportation by rail 
carrier.” It is also essential to review the history surrounding the 
ICC Termination Act’s adoption and subsequent court 
interpretation of the Preemption Clause. To fully understand scope 
of these terms, one must understand the types of regulation the 
Act was indented to preempt. Additionally, it is important to 
explore how this coverage determination might change depending 
on the circumstances under which a refinery is applying for the 
land-use permit—i.e., whether it acts independently, acts as the 
railroad’s agent, or acts in concert with the railroad in some other 
capacity.  
E. ICC Termination Act Preemption Clause: Drafting and 
Legislative History 
1. How Far Does the ICC Termination Act’s Preemption Clause 
Reach? 
It appears that Congress intended the Preemption Clause to 
have far-reaching implications.146 In fact, the House Report 
specifies that the clause represents the “direct and complete pre-
emption of State economic regulation of railroads.”147 Confusingly, 
the Report also purports to eliminate the “former disclaimer 
regarding residual State police powers” as Congress considered it 
“unnecessary, in view of the Federal policy of occupying the entire 
field of economic regulation of the interstate rail transportation 
system.”148 It is unclear whether Congress considered this clause 
                                                                                                     
 145. See infra Part III.E (providing an overview of the ICC Termination Acts 
legislative history and judicial application); Part IV (same).  
 146. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-311, at 95, as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
807 (providing the rationale and purpose of the Preemption Clause).  
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 95–96, as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 807–08. 
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“unnecessary” because the statute clearly preempted state police 
powers or because it clearly did not. However, scholars have 
generally presumed the latter, inferring that the Act meant to 
leave some room for state regulation.149  
The House Report recognizes that, at a minimum, “[s]tates 
retain the police powers reserved by the Constitution.”150 However, 
the Report follows by immediately asserting “the Federal scheme 
of economic regulation and deregulation is intended to address and 
encompass all such regulation and to be completely exclusive.”151 
To reinforce the Preemption Clause’s importance, the Report 
warns that any interference by the States would endanger and 
subvert the “Federal scheme of minimal regulation . . . .”152 For 
these reasons, courts and scholars have had difficulty identifying 
precisely where “completely exclusive” federal preemption should 
begin and state police powers end. 
Congress focused specifically on the preemption issue when it 
conducted hearings regarding the “sunset” of the Interstate 
Commerce Commission.153 In fact, Congress devoted a significant 
portion of testimony to whether federal railroad regulations should 
preempt state and local regulations.154 The majority of those 
testifying believed that local regulation should be preempted.155 
Again, Congress, having witnessed the economic disintegration 
caused by patchwork local regulations in the 1800s, did not wish 
to repeat history in this respect.156  
                                                                                                     
 149. See Strickland, Revitalizing the Presumption, supra note 104, at 1165 
(“Congress considered the preemption clause to be so clear that a savings clause 
protecting state police powers was ‘unnecessary.’”).  
 150. H.R. REP. NO. 104-311, at 96, as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 808. 
 151. Id.  
 152. Id.  
 153. See generally Disposition of the Railroad Authority of the I.C.C., supra 
note 115 (containing testimony regarding the then-potential elimination of the 
I.C.C.).  
 154. See id. (discussing the importance, scope, and application of federal 
preemption of state and local economic regulations).  
 155. See id. at 43–44 (statements of Robert D. Krebs, President, Chairman, & 
CEO, Santa Fe Pacific Corporation; James A. Hagen, Chairman & CEO, 
Consolidated Rail Corporation; and Drew Lewis, Chairman & CEO, Union Pacific 
Corporation) (agreeing that preemption of local and state regulation of railroads 
is necessary for an efficient rail network).  
 156. See id. at 42 (statements of Drew Lewis, Chairman & CEO, Union Pacific 
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After the hearings and Conference Committee, Congress 
expanded further on the meaning and intent behind the general 
jurisdiction provision. Exclusive jurisdiction, Congress explained, 
is “limited to remedies with respect to rail regulation—not State 
and Federal law generally.”157 So, for example, criminal laws 
remain un-preempted.158 Congress also specified that laws should 
remain valid “unless specifically displaced, because 
they . . . generally collide with the scheme of economic 
regulation.”159 Therefore, it seems the Act is intended to preempt 
this type of “economic regulation.”  
The congressional framework of “complete preemption” of 
economic regulation along with some carve-out for traditional 
police powers gives only a vague notion about the kind of 
regulations Congress hoped to preempt. The question is whether 
land-use permitting schemes, intended to protect local residents’ 
health and safety, are examples of such regulations. If Congress 
did not intend to preempt these regulations, then it does not 
matter whether refineries constitute “transportation by rail 
carrier,” as the Act is inapplicable.  
2. What Qualifies as an “Economic Regulation”? 
By 1995, the nation’s railroad system was already on a 
trajectory toward complete deregulation.160 As described in the 
                                                                                                     
Corporation) (noting his belief that “we have to have preemption, . . . without 
preemption, we could and would be subject to a myriad of [sic] State laws” opening 
railroad companies up to lawsuits and other financial obstacles); id. at 109 
(statements of Hon. Gail McDonald, Chairman, ICC) (“Absent such preemption, 
there would be great potential for interference in rail consolidation efforts.”).  
 157. H.R. REP. NO. 104-422, at 167 (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1995 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 852.  
 158. See Strickland, Revitalizing the Presumption, supra note 22, at 1165 
(“Congress surely did not intend to allow railroads to open gambling or 
prostitution businesses that are exempt from generally applicable state laws, and 
subject only to [STB] supervision.”).  
 159. H.R. REP. NO. 104-422, at 167 (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1995 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 852. 
 160. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-311, at 90 (“Since 1980, with the enactment of the 
Staggers Rail Act, the railroad industry has operated in an essentially 
deregulated environment.”).  
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preceding section, the railroads were simply unable to compete 
with other burgeoning methods of transportation.161 One of the 
important purposes behind the ICC Termination Act was to make 
the railroad industry more competitive with trucks, pipelines, and 
barges.162 In fact, by eliminating economic regulations, Congress 
hoped the ICC Termination Act would “further foster” intermodal 
transportation—the transportation of freight via multiple modes, 
including vessel, rail, and pipeline—by “remov[ing] all existing 
restrictions that specifically limit or preclude 
intermodal . . . operations.”163  
A policy supporting the use of intermodal transportation 
suggests that Congress contemplated the notion of nonrail 
facilities—like crude offloading facilities—being used to transport 
freight—like crude oil—and ultimately favored it. Historically, the 
use of transloading facilities—those facilities used to “[transfer] 
goods from one mode of transportation to another in order to have 
the goods reach their final destination”164—has been a major 
subject of litigation.165 Offloading facilities, on the other hand, 
have not. While courts generally treat transloading facilities as 
falling within the Preemption Clause’s coverage,166 it is unclear 
whether an offloading facility would be treated in the same 
manner. Crude offloading facilities, however, do share some 
resemblance to traditional conceptions of intermodal 
transportation.167  
                                                                                                     
 161. See supra Part III.A (presenting a brief history of railroad deregulation).  
 162. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-311, at 90 (explaining that deregulation efforts are 
made more necessary because of “the emergence of the trucking industry, as well 
as the pipeline and barge industries” and the increased competition therefrom).  
 163. S. REP NO. 104-176, at 13 (1995).  
 164. Transloading, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/ 
transloading.asp (last visited Feb. 5, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review).  
 165. See infra notes 263–273 and accompanying text (describing cases 
involving transloading facilities).  
 166. See infra Part IV.C (reviewing case law surrounding transloading 
facilities).  
 167. Compare Maschine zum Übersetzen der Diligencen auf 
Eisenbahnwaggons, WIKIMEDIA COMMONS (1884), https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Datei:Maschine_zum_Übersetzen_der_Diligencen_auf_Eisenbahnwaggons.JPG 
(last visited Mar. 1, 2017) (portraying a stagecoach being transferred onto a 
railcar via a contraption not dissimilar to a crude offloading rack) (on file with the 
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Congress also specifically discussed the importance of 
complete federal control over remedies.168 Congress intended the 
Preemption Clause to insulate the railroads from liability, as 
“[e]xclusive preemption of other remedies would prevent a 
confusing situation where legal actions are instituted under a 
variety of laws.”169 According to some scholars, the ICC 
Termination Act’s preemptive effect should be felt most strongly in 
cases “related to the movement of goods, such as delivery, transfer, 
and loading.”170 These statements support the idea that offloading 
facilities are precisely the types of facilities Congress hoped to 
protect from local intrusion.  
Further examination of changes in the bill and congressional 
testimony helps clarify the meaning of “economic regulation.” 
Specifically, the Committee, and those testifying before it, focused 
heavily on preempting state and local interference with mergers, 
labor restrictions, and other economic regulations.171 Many of those 
testifying called on Congress to enact preemptive regulations 
similar to the legislation passed during the previous year that 
prevented localities from regulating motor carriers.172 The motor 
carrier regulations significantly curtailed local interference by 
                                                                                                     
Washington and Lee Law Review), with Maria Gallucci, US Oil Book 2014: US 
Railroads Are Moving Greater Volumes of Crude Oil This Year Amid Bakken 
Drilling Boom, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2014), http://www.ibtimes.com/us-oil-
boom-2014-us-railroads-are-moving-greater-volumes-crude-oil-year-amid-
bakken-1672564 (last visited June 1, 2017) (portraying a crude-by-rail trail 
stationed at an offloading rack) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).  
 168. See S. Rep. No. 104-176, at 57 (1995) (statement of Sen. John Ashcroft) 
(“[R]ecent court decisions have allowed actions against carriers to proceed under 
other laws, . . . [and] exclusive remedies are needed to provide consistent methods 
of resolving disputes and prevent needless litigation.”).  
 169. Id. 
 170. Strickland, Revitalizing the Presumption, supra note 22, at 1162 n.63.  
 171. See Disposition of the Railroad Authority of the I.C.C., supra note 115, at 
109 (statement of Hon. Gail McDonald, Chairman, Interstate Commerce 
Commission) (stating that without preemption “[s]tates and localities could 
attempt to impose locally-oriented conditions on rail consolidations that could 
effectively block a transaction or dilute its more general public benefits”).  
 172. See id. at 223 (statement of Joseph Canny, Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of Transportation Policy, U.S. Department of Transportation) (“We believe that 
state authority should be preempted by statute, as was recently done with motor 
carrier regulation . . . .”).  
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preempting any regulation impacting the price of bus 
transportation by interstate carriers.173   
Regarding mergers, those testifying before Congress 
extensively discussed whether to remove antitrust enforcement 
authority from the DOT and give it to the Department of Justice 
(DOJ).174 Two important considerations animated congressional 
thinking regarding this transfer of power: (1) whether the 
openness of the pre-merger review proceedings would be 
compromised; and (2) whether regulatory attempts by states and 
localities would continue to be sufficiently preempted if antitrust 
enforcement authority was transferred to the DOJ.175 Erring on 
the side of preemption, Congress decided to house antitrust review 
authority with the STB, rather than the DOJ, and to generally 
exempt railroads from most traditional antitrust laws.176 Even for 
antitrust enforcement, Congress desired STB dominance.  
Congress also used the ICC Termination Act to insulate Class 
II and Class III railroads from more onerous regulation.177 Over 
the objections of a strong pro-labor contingent,178 Congress relaxed 
                                                                                                     
 173. See FAA Authorization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-311, § 211 (1994) 
(codified at 49 U.S.C. § 10936 (2012))  
A State or political subdivision of a State may not enforce any law or 
regulation relating to interstate fares for the transportation of 
passengers by bus by an interstate motor carrier of passengers over 
routes authorized by the Commission. 
 174. See Disposition of the Railroad Authority of the I.C.C., supra note 115, at 
5–61 (containing the testimony of multiple parties regarding antitrust 
enforcement and the railroads). 
 175. See id. at 31–33 (statement of Hon. Gail McDonald, Chairman, Interstate 
Commerce Commission) (discussing the advantages of keeping antitrust and 
merger review authority housed in the DOT).   
 176. See 49 U.S.C. § 10706(a)(2)(A) (“[T]he Sherman Act . . . , the Clayton 
Act . . . , the Federal Trade Commission Act . . . , sections 73 and 74 of the Wilson 
Tariff Act . . . , and the Act of June 19, 1936 . . . do not apply to parties and other 
persons with respect to making or carrying out the agreement.”).  
 177. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 10902 (2012) (promoting the “clearer and more 
expeditious handling” of transactions by Class II and Class III rail carriers in 
order); H.R. REP. NO. 104-422, at 180 (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1995 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 865 (“Class II rail carriers acquiring a line under this section are 
subject to a mandatory [one]-year severance pay requirement . . . . No protection 
is imposed on Class III rail carrier line acquisitions.”).  
 178. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-422, at 524 (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1995 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 849 (“I strongly object to the manner in which this bill treats 
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labor protections for Class II and III railroads as part of an effort 
to make rail carriage more competitive with pipeline and motor 
transportation.179 In its report, the House reinforced the idea that 
the “Committee consider[ed] [the less stringent protections] crucial 
to avoid imposing the large and potentially fatal costs of unfunded 
labor protection benefit mandates on on Class II and Class III 
transactions.”180 
It appears Congress favored regulation of Class II and III 
railroads even less than Class I railroads.181 Importantly, Class II 
and III railroads are the most frequently utilized railroad systems 
for freight shipping.182 They provide freight carriers access to a 
large network of towns and ports inaccessible to Class I 
railroads.183 Therefore, local permitting requirements for the 
construction of crude offloading facilities are more likely to impact 
Class II and III railroads, as opposed to Class I railroads.184 
Lastly, knowing what is not included within the umbrella term 
“economic regulation” can be just as helpful as knowing what is 
included. For example, the House Report specifically allows for two 
exemptions from the expansive deregulation effort. First, the 
Report provides that state and federal securities laws are not 
necessarily preempted.185 Second, the House Report states that the 
Committee “does not intend for this section to alter any existing 
law . . . governing railroad retirement benefits and railroad 
                                                                                                     
railroad labor.”).  
 179. See 49 U.S.C. § 10902(d) (providing that labor protections for Class II 
and Class III railroads are lower than those of Class I railroads).  
 180. H.R. REP. NO. 104-311 at 102, as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 814.  
 181. See Frittelli, U.S. Rail Transportation of Crude Oil, supra note 49, at 20 
(stating that “[m]embers of Congress have been concerned with preserving short 
line rail service” and providing multiple measures Congress enacted to aid in their 
preservation).  
 182. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-422, at 524–25 (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1995 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 864–65 (explaining that the statutory divisions between Class I 
and Class II and III railroad were intended to “promote clearer and more 
expeditious handling” of freight).  
 183. See Frittelli, U.S. Rail Transportation of Crude Oil, supra note 46, at 20 
(describing the use of “shortline” tracks for crude-by-rail delivery).  
 184. Id. 
 185. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-311, at 96, as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
808 (stating that the abolition of the ICC “places the railroad industry for 
securities purposes in the same position as other industries”).  
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unemployment insurance.”186 In providing these specific 
exemptions, Congress sets some boundary lines, as presumably, 
laws regulating securities and retirement pensions would 
otherwise be included within the umbrella of “economic 
regulation.” 
Overall, the ICC Termination Act’s legislative history 
emphasizes economic preemption. The contours of this economic 
preemption are shaped by congressional testimony and the 
statements of congressmen and senators. Congress not only 
favored intermodal transportation options, but it also hoped that 
lowering barriers to competition would increase the railroads’ 
competitiveness with trucks and pipelines.187 However, it is still 
important to observe how the federal courts have applied the Act 
in order to fully understand the Act’s scope.   
3. Who is a “Rail Carrier”? What Constitutes “Services and 
Facilities” of Such Carriers? 
There is almost no mention of the definition of the term “rail 
carrier” or the rationale behind its drafting in the legislative 
history. The lone mention of the definition of “rail carrier” appears 
in the Senate Report.188 The Report requests that the Conference 
Committee “update and clarify the term ‘rail carrier’” and “remove 
references to passenger transportation.”189 The final Act specified 
that the definition “does not include street, suburban, or 
interurban electric railways not operated as part of the general 
system of rail transportation,” but does not exempt passenger lines 
entirely.190 Whether the definition is “clarified,” however, is an 
open question.  
                                                                                                     
 186. Id.  
 187. See S. Rep. No. 104-176, at 6 (1995) (describing negatively patchwork 
regulations that would “weaken the [railroad] industry’s efficiency and 
competitive viability”).   
 188. See id. at 29 (1995) (discussing Senate concerns with the definition of 
“rail carrier” provided in the House Report). 
 189. Id.  
 190. 49 U.S.C. § 10102(5).  
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In the absence of legislative history, it is useful to look at 
precedent acts that define the terms of art used in the ICC 
Termination Act. The ICC Termination Act departs from prior acts 
in two important ways. First, the Act redefines the term “railroad” 
from its original meaning in the Inter-State Commerce Act of 1887 
(ICA). Under the ICA, “railroad” is defined as “all bridges and 
ferries used or operated in connection with any railroad” and any 
“road in use by any corporation operating a railroad . . . .”191 No 
other act redefined this term. Rather than replace the definition, 
both the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act (4R 
Act), passed in 1976, and the Staggers Act, passed in 1980, simply 
refer back to the definition used in the ICA.192  
It makes some sense that Congress would seek to replace the 
ICA’s definition of “railroad,” as the ICA was the act that created 
the ICC, the agency Congress now sought to to disband.193 
Moreover, it appears that the ICC Termination Act’s definition of 
“railroad” is in fact much broader than the ICA’s.194 This may be a 
function of technological innovations that occurred between 1887 
and 1995, or perhaps Congress’s general goal of fewer regulations.  
The second distinction is that the ICC Termination Act creates 
two separate definitions for “rail carrier” and “railroad.”195 This 
fact is not addressed in the legislative history either. However, it 
seems safe to assume that “rail carrier” is a broader term than 
“railroad,” as the latter term is used in the definition of the 
former.196 It is difficult to divine why exactly Congress redefined 
                                                                                                     
 191. Inter-State Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, sec. 1, 24 Stat. 379, 379 
(1887).  
 192. See Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. 
No. 94-210, § 102(7), 90 Stat. 31, 34 (1976) (referring to the Interstate Commerce 
Act for the definition of “railroad”); see, e.g., Staggers Rail Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 
96-448, §§ 201(a), 203(b)(1), 90 Stat. 1895, 1898, 1900 (providing that the Act 
references back to ICC jurisdiction in defining “railroad”).  
 193. See Inter-State Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, sec. 11, 24 Stat. 379, 383 
(1887) (“[A] Commission is hereby created and established to be known as the 
Inter-State Commerce Commission . . . .”). 
 194. See supra notes 190–191 and accompanying text (listing the ICA’s 
definition of “rail carrier” and the ICC Termination Acts definition of “rail 
carrier”). 
 195. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 10102(5), (6) (defining “rail carrier” and “railroad” 
respectively).  
 196. See id. § 10102(5) (“‘[R]ail carrier’ means a person providing common 
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“railroad” and added “rail carrier,” but the result is likely a broader 
term than was originally meant.  
IV. ICC Termination Act Preemption: Judicial Application and 
Analysis 
Neither the STB nor the courts seem to have adopted 
Congress’s more limited view of ICC Termination Act preemption. 
Whereas both the congressional record and the text of the Act itself 
focus on total economic freedom for the railways,197 Congress and 
the President hoped the Act would be interpreted more broadly and 
enforced more vigorously than the legislative history might 
suggest.198  
One axiomatic line that appears in much ICC Termination Act 
litigation captures the courts’ broad jurisprudential approach well: 
“[The Inter-State Commerce Act is] among the most pervasive and 
comprehensive of federal regulatory schemes.”199 In fact, many 
courts find it “difficult to imagine a broader statement of 
Congress’s intent to preempt state regulatory authority over 
railroad operations” than the one in Section 10501(b).200 This is 
evident from the overview of ICC Termination Act’s preemption 
jurisprudence that follows.  
                                                                                                     
carrier railroad transportation for compensation . . . .”).  
 197. See supra Part III.E.2 (exploring the meaning of economic regulation in 
terms of the ICC Termination Act).  
 198. See Signing Statement, supra note 111, at 933-1 (“[The President] 
call[ed] upon the board to use this authority to the fullest extent to benefit 
consumers and facilitate economic growth.”). 
 199. Chi. & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 318 
(1981).  
 200. City of Auburn v. United States, 154 F.3d 1025, 1030 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(quoting CSX Transp., Inc. v. Ga. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 944 F. Supp. 1573, 1581 
(N.D. Ga. 1996)).  
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A. The General ICC Termination Act Preemption Rule 
1. Categorical Preemption 
The federal courts and the STB have interpreted Section 
10501(b) as preempting two broad groups of direct regulation: 
preclearance and matters directly regulated by the STB. First, the 
Act preempts any form of local permitting or preclearance over 
railroad activity.201 The ICC Termination Act affirmatively 
preempts any direct regulation over railroad practices and 
operations, regardless of whether it is discriminatory or 
unreasonable.202 For example, federal courts have consistently 
struck down laws regulating railroad crossings, train speed, and 
other operating requirements.203  
The scope of the categorical preclearance preemption changes 
slightly depending upon the case and the Circuit.204 Even so, most 
courts “recognize[] that requiring a rail carrier to obtain a locally 
issued permit before conducting rail operations . . . will impose an 
unreasonable burden on rail transportation.”205 The STB went 
even further when it provided that “any form of state or local 
permitting or preclearance that, by its nature, could be used to 
                                                                                                     
 201. See Green Mountain R.R. v. Vermont, 404 F.3d 638, 643 (2d Cir. 2005) 
(“We need not draw a line that divides local regulations between those that are 
preempted and those that are not, because in [the] case [of pre-construction 
permit requirements] preemption is clear.”); DesertXpress Enterprises, LLC—
Petition for Declaratory Order, FD 34914, slip op. at 3 n.4 (STB served June 27, 
2007) (providing that preclearance is one of two broad categories of preempted 
state and local action).  
 202. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Dep’t of Transp., 227 Or. App. 
468, 473–74 (Or. Ct. App. 2009) (distinguishing between laws of general 
applicability and those that specifically target railroad operations).  
 203. See Friberg v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 267 F.3d 439, 453 (5th Cir. 2001) 
(“Regulating the time a train can occupy a rail crossing impacts, in such areas as 
train speed, length and scheduling, the way a railroad operates its trains . . . .”); 
Burlington Northern, 227 Or. App. at 474 (concluding that “[d]ictating where and 
for how long a train may stop . . . [is] a regulation of railroad operations” and is 
therefore preempted).  
 204. See Strickland, Revitalizing the Presumption, supra note 22, at 1166–67 
(providing that the 2nd, 9th, and D.C. Circuits have adopted a broader view of 
preemption than the 3rd, 6th, 8th, and 11th Circuits).  
 205. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. City of Alexandria, 608 F.3d 150, 160 (4th Cir. 2010).   
CAN LOCALITIES STOP CRUDE-BY-RAIL? 181 
deny the railroad the ability to conduct its operation or to proceed 
with activities that the Board has authorized” is preempted by 
Section 10501(b).206 This ruling suggests that local regulation of 
third parties that “could be used” to impede railroad operations 
may be preempted. However, no subsequent STB ruling has 
suggested that Section 10501(b) should be applied with this level 
of breadth.207 Overall, most cases deal with preclearance for 
railroad projects, not third party projects that may impact the 
railroads.208 
The second type of regulation categorically preempted 
includes “state or local regulation of matters directly regulated by 
the Board.”209 In other words, the ICC Termination Act preempts 
state laws when they “may reasonably be said to have the effect of 
managing or governing rail transportation, while permitting the 
continued application of laws having a more remote or incidental 
effect on rail transportation.”210 The Act replaces state and local 
remedies with those provided under the STB’s exclusive 
jurisdiction,211 thereby excluding local regulations providing 
alternative requirements.212  
                                                                                                     
 206. DesertXpress, FD 34914, slip op. at 3 n.4.  
 207. See Norfolk S. Ry. Co.—Petition for Declaratory Order, FD 35701, slip 
op. at 4 (STB served Nov. 4, 2013) (explaining that nuisance claims are preempted 
because they “directly result from . . . rail operations”). 
    208.   See generally supra Part IV (reviewing case law applying the ICC 
Termination Act Preemption Clause).  
 209. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., FD 35701, slip op. at 3.  
 210. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Dep’t of Transp., 227 Or. App. 468, 
472–73 (Or. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting N.Y. Susquehanna & W. Ry. Corp. v. Jackson, 
500 F.3d 238, 252 (3d Cir. 2007)).  
 211. See 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b)(1) (providing that the “remedies provided in this 
part” are exclusive).  
 212. See Cities of Auburn & Kent, WA, 2 S.T.B. 330, 1997 WL 362017, at *6 
(1997) (“[W]here the local permitting process could be used to frustrate or defeat 
an activity that is regulated at the Federal level, the state or local process is 
preempted.”).  
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2. As-Applied Preemption 
Some local actions, rather than being categorically preempted, 
are simply preempted as applied.213 Federal railroad law does not 
preempt state law where rail activities are “merely a peripheral 
concern” of the regulations at issue.214 Local regulations are only 
preempted when applied in a manner that: (1) “unreasonably 
burden[s] or interfere[s]” with rail transportation,215 or 
(2) discriminates against rail carriage.216  
The determination of whether a regulation unreasonably 
interferes with rail operations “is a fact-specific one” in which the 
court exercises its “policy-based judgment.”217 The “most obvious” 
element used to determine if a regulation is unreasonably 
burdensome is whether the regulation is “so draconian that it 
prevents the railroad from carrying out its business in a sensible 
fashion.”218 For example, when a locality’s apparent goal is to 
constrain, rather than render safe, rail operations, the locality is 
likely regulating in an unreasonably burdensome manner.219 
Furthermore, generally applicable permitting and land-use 
requirements are not significant oversteps of local authority, 
                                                                                                     
 213. See Franks Inv. Co. v. Union Pac. R.R., 593 F.3d 404, 414 (5th Cir. 2010) 
(“[I]t is well settled that states cannot take an action that would have the effect 
of foreclosing or unduly restricting a railroad’s ability to conduct any part of 
operations . . . .”).  
 214. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, Millmen’s Union, Local 2020 v. Garmon, 
359 U.S. 236, 243 (1959).  
 215. See Ass’n of Am. R.Rs. v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 622 F.3d 1095, 
1097–98 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Generally speaking, ICCTA does not preempt state or 
local laws if they are laws of general applicability that do not unreasonably 
interfere with interstate commerce.”); New England Transrail, LLC—Petition for 
Declaratory Order, FD 34797 (STD served July 10, 2007) (“Other state or local 
requirements are not preempted unless, as applied, they would have the effect of 
preventing or unreasonably interfering with interstate commerce.”).  
 216. See N.Y. Susquehanna & W. Ry. Corp. v. Jackson, 500 F.3d 238, 254 (3d 
Cir. 2007) (“[A] state law that affects rail carriage survives preemption if it does 
not discriminate against rail carriage . . . .”).  
 217. Norfolk S. Ry. Co.—Petition for Declaratory Order, FD 35701, slip op. at 
3 (STB served Nov. 4, 2013).  
 218. New York Susquehanna, 500 F.3d at 254.  
 219. See Cities of Auburn & Kent, WA, 2 S.T.B. 330, 1997 WL 362017, at *6 
(finding that the city’s “admitted goal is to constrain [the rail carrier’s] train 
operations,” and therefore, the locality is preempted).  
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unless they discriminate against rail carriage.220 Some cases 
suggest that only regulations not involving “the exercise of 
discretion on subjective questions” are permissible,221 while other 
courts have insisted that this interpretation is far too generous.222 
In Green Mountain Railroad Corp. v. Vermont,223 the court 
provides additional factors to help determine whether a town’s 
exercise of traditional police powers is acceptable.224 These include: 
(a) “the extent that the regulations protect public health and 
safety,” (b) whether they “are settled and defined,” (c) whether they 
“can be obeyed with reasonable certainty,” and (d) whether they 
“entail no extended or open-ended delays.”225 
Local land-use ordinances are often broadly applicable and 
applied with some degree of objectivity. Therefore, it might be hard 
to find a circumstance where a locality denying a crude offloading 
facility permit based on one of these ordinances is acting 
“discriminatorily” toward rail carriers. However, some courts have 
recognized a pretext-based argument that would allow a refinery 
to argue that these objective regulations were being 
discriminatorily applied.226  
                                                                                                     
 220. See New York Susquehanna, 500 F.3d at 253 (“[E]ven pedestrian 
regulations like building codes must be applied in a manner that does not 
discriminate against railroad operations to avoid preemption.”); Green Mountain 
R.R. v. Vermont, 404 F.3d 638, 643 (2d Cir. 2005) (“Electrical, plumbing and fire 
codes, direct environmental regulations enacted for the protection of the public 
health and safety, and other generally applicable, non-discriminatory regulations 
and permit requirements would seem to withstand preemption.”); CXS Transp., 
Inc., 2005 WL 584026, at *8 (S.T.B. 2005) (declaratory order) (invalidating a law 
attempting to prevent terrorism on the ground that it was unreasonably 
burdensome and discriminatory toward rail transportation).  
 221. Green Mountain, 404 F.3d at 643.  
 222. See, e.g., New York Susquehanna, 500 F.3d at 254 (stating that generally 
applicable regulations must be “settled,” “definite,” “avoid open-ended delays,” 
“clear,” and not able to be used as a “pretext” for interfering with rail service).  
 223. 404 F.3d 638 (2d Cir. 2005).  
 224. See id. at 643.  
 225. Id.  
 226. See infra Part IV.A.3 (providing an overview of pretextual regulation).  
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3. Pretextual Regulations 
Even regulations that appear facially nondiscriminatory per 
the Green Mountain factors might still be invalidated for a more 
tacit form of discrimination: pretext. While courts have not 
frequently utilized a pretextual analysis, the court in New York 
Susquehanna & Western Railway Corp. v. Jackson,227 required 
that the regulations be “clear enough that the rail carrier can 
follow them and that the state cannot easily use them as a pretext 
for interfering with or curtailing rail service.”228  
STB filings show that localities typically preemptively defend 
against the argument that an otherwise objectively broad 
ordinance is simply pretext for discrimination against railroads.229 
Generally, local arguments in favor of land-use permit denials 
contain three elements: (1) the effects of the planned construction, 
not of the railroad, caused the permit denial; (2) the facility is still 
able to receive rail service; and (3) local ordinances are not a 
pretext for regulating the railroad.230  
Some cases have suggested that a rail carrier, too, can be 
subject to pretextual limitations. The ICC Termination Act defines 
the term “rail carrier” as a “person providing common carrier 
railroad transportation,”231 where a “person” can be a “trustee, 
receiver assignee, or personal representative.”232 This indicates 
that agents and those “acting under the auspices of a rail carrier” 
are sometimes covered by the Act.233 However, the STB has stated 
that this fact does not “suggest that a party can contractually 
determine its status as a railroad carrier for regulatory 
                                                                                                     
 227. 500 F.3d 238 (3d Cir. 2007).  
 228. New York Susquehanna, 500 F.3d at 254 (emphasis removed).  
 229. See SEA-3—Petition for Declaratory Order, FD 35853, slip op. at 3 
(S.T.B. served Mar. 17, 2015) (recounting the city of Portsmouth’s argument 
defending their permit denial); Reply to Pet. for Declaratory Order at 12–13, City 
of Benicia, FD 36036 (July 7, 2016) (providing an overview of the city’s reasons 
for denying Valero’s land-use permit application). 
 230. Id.   
 231. 49 U.S.C. § 10102(5).  
 232. Id. § 10102(4).  
 233. SEA-3, FD 35853, slip op. at 6.  
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purposes.”234 In other words, “railroads and loaders may not 
change by contract what in practice is a substantially different 
relationship.”235  
B. The Scope of “Economic Regulation” in the Case Law 
The case law is not quite as categorical in its distinctions 
between economic and non-economic regulation as the ICC 
Termination Act’s drafters might have envisioned. In fact, some 
courts flagrantly flout the legislative history, with one court 
stating “there is nothing in the case law that supports [the city’s] 
argument that, through the ICC [Termination Act], Congress only 
intended preemption of economic regulation of the railroads.”236 
Yet, this statement is contradicted by the House Report, which 
argues for the “direct and complete pre-emption of State economic 
regulation of railroads.”237  
Neither the STB nor the courts have developed any 
comprehensive rule to determine whether a regulation is economic 
or non-economic, perhaps because they do not see the distinction 
as determinative. Rather, these determinations are made on a 
“case-by-case” basis.238 For example, the courts and the STB have 
found the following types of regulations to be preempted: nuisance 
claims,239 zoning regulations that prevent the use of freight 
yards,240 regulations limiting the use of “integral” transloading 
                                                                                                     
 234. Hi Tech Trans, LLC v. New Jersey, 382 F.3d 295, 308 n.19 (3d Cir. 2004).  
 235. N.Y. Susquehanna & W. Ry. Corp. v. Jackson, 500 F.3d 238, 250 (3d Cir. 
2007).  
 236. City of Auburn v. United States, 154 F.3d 1025, 1030 (9th Cir. 1998).  
 237. H.R. REP. NO. 104-311, at 95, as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 807.  
 238. City of Alexandria, VA—Petition for Declaratory Order, FD 35157, slip 
op. at 2 (S.T.B. served Feb. 17, 2009).  
 239. See Norfolk S. Ry. Co.—Petition for Declaratory Order, FD 35701, slip 
op. at 1 (S.T.B. served Nov. 4, 2013) (finding claims for damages caused by “noise 
and vibration as well as the discharge of smoke, dust, dirt and other particulates” 
preempted).  
 240. See Bo. & Me. Corp. & Springfield Terminal R.R. Co.—Petition for 
Declaratory Order, FD 35749, slip op. at 4 (S.T.B. served July 13, 2013) (stating 
that “[t]he Town’s order prohibiting all rail traffic to the warehouse conflict with 
the federal right of [Petitioner] to request common carrier service” and are 
therefore preempted by Section 10501(b)).  
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facilities,241 and rules governing the amount of time a train can 
stop at rail crossings.242 It is difficult to glean any patterns from 
this particular set of rulings. 
Environmental regulations have been a particular problem for 
the courts. The court in City of Auburn v. United States243 
specifically noted that economic and environmental regulation 
could be one in the same.244 The court further posited that “if local 
authorities have the ability to impose ‘environmental’ permitting 
regulations on the railroad, such power will in fact amount to 
‘economic regulation’ if the carrier is prevented from constructing, 
acquiring, operating, abandoning or discontinuing a line.”245 In 
contrast, the Green Mountain court called any artificial 
distinctions between economic and environmental regulations “not 
useful.”246 Ultimately, courts have focused on the level of “burden” 
to draw the line between permissible and impermissible regulation 
rather than focusing on their economic or non-economic qualities, 
as the legislative history might suggest.247 
The court in Dakota, Minnesota & Eastern Railroad Corp. v. 
South Dakota,248 drew a slightly different line, focusing instead on 
the considerations the state needed to make in order to approve or 
not approve a permit.249 In this case, Dakota, Minnesota & Eastern 
                                                                                                     
 241. See Green Mountain R.R. v. Vermont, 404 F.3d 638, 642 (2d Cir. 2005) 
(determining that the ICC Termination Acts preempted the pre-construction 
permit requirement for an integral transloading facility).  
 242. See Friberg v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 267 F. 3d 439, 443 (5th Cir. 2001) 
(providing that “[r]egulating the time a train can occupy a rail crossing 
impacts . . . the way a railroad operates its trains, with concomitant economic 
ramifications” and is therefore preempted by Section 10501(b)).  
 243. 145 F.3d 102 (9th Cir. 1998).  
 244. See id. at 1031 (“[G]iven the broad language of § 10501(b)(2) . . . the 
distinction between ‘economic’ and ‘environmental’ regulation begins to blur.”).  
 245. Id.  
 246. Green Mountain, 404 F.3d at 644.  
 247. See N.Y. Susquehanna & W. Ry. Corp. v. Jackson, 500 F.3d 238, 252 (3d 
Cir. 2007) (“What matters is the degree to which the challenged regulation 
burdens rail transportation, not whether it is styled as ‘economic’ or 
‘environmental.’”).  
 248. 236 F. Supp. 2d 989 (D.S.D. 2002), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 362 F.3d 
512 (8th Cir. 2004).  
 249. See id. at 1007 (explaining that the statute was invalid because it 
“necessitates that the Governor consider economic, environmental, and public 
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Railroad challenged a South Dakota law that granted railroads 
eminent domain powers, but placed restrictions on those powers.250 
The restrictions included: (1) requiring the railroad to demonstrate 
that it had sufficient financial resources to undertake construction 
and potential mitigation, and (2) requiring the Governor to 
consider the “economic, environmental, and public safety 
implications of the [rail] project” before approving a railroad’s use 
of eminent domain.251 Ultimately, the court struck down Section 
49-16A-75.3 reasoning that the state cannot “regulate 
indirectly . . . what it cannot regulate directly.”252 By doing so, the 
statute violated Section 10501(b) of the ICC Termination Act.253  
Dakota demonstrates that courts are willing to look into the 
decision-making process of a local official (i.e., the Governor) to 
determine whether the official’s considerations are economic in 
nature. Yet, courts do not seem curtailed by the “economic” 
confines outlined in the legislative history. In contrast to this broad 
vison of economic regulation, the courts have trimmed back on the 
potential scope of the term “rail carrier.”  
C. The Preemption Clause’s Application to Third Parties: Who Is a 
“Rail Carrier”? 
As discussed, the ICC Termination Act only applies to “rail 
carriers” and the services and facilities of such carriers.254 While 
there may be significant wiggle room within this definition, courts 
have not typically interpreted it too broadly. Instead, courts and 
the STB have insisted that “facilities not integrally related to the 
provision of interstate rail service are not subject to our 
                                                                                                     
safety implications of the . . . project. Yet, state regulation of such areas in the 
context of railroads is preempted by federal law.”).  
 250. See id. (requiring a showing of sufficient financial resource among other 
things). 
 251. S.D.C.L. § 49–16A–75.3(2).  
 252. Dakota, Minn., & E. R.R., 236 F. Supp. 2d at 1007. 
 253. See id. (noting that “state regulation of such areas in the context of 
railroads is preempted by federal law”). 
 254. See supra Part III.C (detailing the ICC Termination Act Preemption 
Clause).   
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jurisdiction or subject to federal preemption.”255 Whether a facility 
is “integrally related” depends on the particulars of the case.256 
Multiple different methods have been utilized in making this 
determination.  
One interesting distinction between the STB and the federal 
courts is that, while the federal courts typically use the “rail 
carrier” definition alone,257 the STB uses the ICC Termination 
Act’s definition of “railroad” rather than “rail carrier” when 
characterizing Section 10501(b)’s reach.258 As discussed 
previously, Section 10501(b) states that the Act’s preemptive scope 
covers “transportation by rail carrier,” but the term “railroad” is 
used in the definition of “rail carrier,” potentially broadening the 
meaning of rail carrier considerably.259 While this distinction does 
not seem to impact case outcomes, it lends some support to a 
broader reading of the term.260  
In general, courts have relied on a series of factors to help 
determine whether an entity is a “rail carrier.” In Padgett v. 
Surface Transportation Board,261 the court used the following 
considerations to classify a liquid petroleum gas transloading 
facility as a “rail carrier”: “(1) whether the rail carrier holds out 
transloading facilities as part of its business, (2) the degree of 
control retained by the [rail] carrier, (3) property right and 
maintenance obligation, (4) contractual liability, and 
(5) financing.”262 These factors have been replicated and rephrased 
                                                                                                     
 255. Borough of Riverdale, 4 S.T.B. 380, 1999 WL 715272, at 387.  
 256. See SEA-3—Petition for Declaratory Order, FD 35853, slip op. at 5 
(S.T.B. served Mar. 17, 2015) (“Whether a particular activity is considered part of 
transportation by rail carrier under § 10501 is a case-by-case, fact-specific 
determination.”).  
 257. See Green Mountain R.R. v. Vermont, 404 F.3d 638, 640 (2d Cir. 2005) 
(citing to Section 10102(5)); N.Y. Susquehanna & W. Ry. Corp. v. Jackson, 500 
F.3d 238, 247 (3d Cir. 2007) (same).  
 258. See Valero Refining Co.—Petition for Declaratory Order, FD 36036, slip 
op. at 4 (S.T.B. served Sept. 20, 2016) (citing to Section 10102(6)); SEA-3, FD 
35853, slip op. at 5 (same). 
 259. See 49 U.S.C. § 10102(5) (emphasis added) (“‘[R]ail carrier’ means a 
person providing common carrier railroad transportation . . . .”).  
 260. See supra Part III.D (discussing the potentially expansive definition of 
“rail carrier”). 
 261. 804 F.3d 103 (1st Cir. 2015).  
 262. Id. at 108 (quoting Tex. Cent. Bus. Lines Corp. v. MAALT L.P., 669 F.3d 
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in various ways, but have largely remained the same throughout 
the case law.263  
To explore the practical breadth of the term “rail carrier,” it is 
important to investigate which non-traditional rail facilities have 
been thought to fall within its scope. In a seminal case, the state of 
New Jersey challenged New York Susquehanna and Western 
Railway Corporation’s (Susquehanna) construction of solid waste 
transloading facilities.264 The railroad either owned or leased the 
land on which these facilities were built.265 Rather than operating 
the transloading facility itself, Susquehanna hired a third party to 
“unload the trucks bringing in the waste, oversee its storage, and 
load it onto rail cars.”266 The state argued that Susquehanna’s 
waste sorting operations were not “‘integrally’ or ‘closely’ related to 
providing rail service” and therefore should not be considered 
“transportation” under the ICC Termination Act.267 Yet, the court 
held that transloading facilities fall within the scope of 
“transportation” as defined by the ICC Termination Act.268   
In determining that New Jersey’s complaint was preempted, 
the Susquehanna court identified several attributes that 
supported the claim that the storage and transloading facility was 
a “rail carrier”: (1) Susquehanna built, owned, and advertised the 
facility as its own; and (2) Susquehanna’s agent operated the 
                                                                                                     
525, 530–31 (5th Cir. 2012)).  
 263. See, e.g., City of Alexandria, VA—Petition for Declaratory Order, FD 
35157, slip op. at 2–3 (S.T.B. served Feb. 17, 2009)  
[Listing factors such as:] [1] whether the rail carrier holds out 
transloading as part of its service; [2] whether the railroad is 
contractually liable for damage to the shipment during loading or 
unloading; [3] whether the rail carrier owns the transloading facility; 
[4] whether the third party is compensated by the carrier or the 
shipper; [5] the degree of control retained by the carrier over the third 
party; and [6] the other terms of the contract between the carrier and 
the third party. 
 264. See New York Susquehanna, 500 F.3d at 242 (detailing New Jersey’s 
allegations against New York Susquehanna).  
 265. See id. at 242 (“Susquehanna built these facilities itself and either leased 
or owned the land.”).  
 266. Id.  
 267. Id. at 247.  
 268. Id.   
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facility.269 These factors are important because they imply a 
requirement the rail carrier must assume a certain degree of 
liability to transpose its preemptive power.270  
The STB has been more circumspect than the federal courts 
with regard to transloading and offloading facilities, presuming 
there is a difference. For example, in Borough of Riverdale,271 the 
STB was asked to determine whether a particular facility was 
more corn processing plant—not “integrally related” to 
transportation and not covered by the ICC Termination Act—or 
more transloading facility, and therefore covered by the Act.272 
Rather than deciding, the STB, for procedural reasons not relevant 
here, instead provided general guidance regarding their 
jurisdiction, suggesting that “manufacturing activities and 
facilities” are not subject to STB jurisdiction, whereas “facilities 
that are part of a railroad’s ability to provide transportation 
services” would be.273  
V. The Preemption Clause Does Not and Should Not Cover Crude-
by-Rail Offloading Facilities 
Whether the ICC Termination Act preempts local land-use 
permitting denials over crude-by-rail offloading facilities depends 
on the two questions explored at length previously in this Note. 
The first question is whether local permitting requirements for the 
construction of crude-by-rail offloading facilities are the kind of 
regulations the Act was intended to preempt. The second is 
whether refineries can properly be considered “rail carriers” and 
are therefore subject to STB jurisdiction. Both of these questions 
                                                                                                     
 269. Id. at 250.  
 270. See id. (“Susquehanna could be sued for breach of contract (or potentially 
negligence or some other tort) if something went wrong; the Hi Tech railroad could 
not . . . .”).  
 271. 4 S.T.B. 380, 1999 WL 715272.  
 272. See id. at 387 (“If this facility is not integrally related to providing 
transportation services, but rather serves only a manufacturing or production 
purpose, then, like any non-railroad property, it would be subject to applicable 
state and local regulation.”).   
 273. Id. at 387.  
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must be answered in the affirmative before the ICC Termination 
Act can preempt local land-use permit denials.  
A. Local Regulations Covering Crude-by-Rail Offloading Facilities 
Are the “Economic Regulations” Intended to Be Covered by the 
ICC Termination Act 
Local regulations must be “economic regulations” in order for 
the ICC Termination Act to preempt them.274 The text of the Act, 
the legislative history, and the case law are in rare alignment on 
this point. The first indication that the Act is intended to cover 
local regulations over crude offloading facilities comes from the 
very text of the statute. For example, the definition of “rail 
carrier”—“a person providing common carrier railroad 
transportation for compensation”—includes the word “railroad.”275 
And the scope of the term “railroad” includes “intermodal 
equipment.”276 The Act also hints at the inclusion of transloading 
facilities by including “equipment . . . related to the movement of . 
. . property” within the definition of “transportation.”277  
Crude-by-rail offloading racks bear considerable resemblance 
both to “intermodal equipment” and to “transloading facilities.” 
The term “intermodal equipment” refers to equipment used to 
transfer freight from one mode of transportation (i.e., rail) to 
another (i.e., truck).278 As a term of art, this generally pertains to 
shipping containers and the equipment used to transport these 
containers.279 Whereas “transload” equipment, or in this case 
                                                                                                     
 274. See supra Part III.E.2 (discussing the term “economic regulation” in the 
ICC Termination Act legislative history).  
 275. See supra note 133 and accompanying text (defining “rail carrier” per the 
ICC Termination Act).  
 276. See supra note 135 and accompanying text (defining “railroad” per the 
ICC Termination Act).  
 277. See supra note 131 and accompanying text (defining “transportation” per 
the ICC Termination Act).  
 278. See ASS’N OF AM. R.RS., RAIL INTERMODAL KEEPS AMERICA MOVING 1 (Apr. 
2016), https://www.aar.org/BackgroundPapers/Rail%20Intermodal.pdf (defining 
“rail intermodal”). 
 279. See id. (“Rail intermodal is the long-haul movement of shipping 
containers and truck trailers by rail, combined with a truck or water movement 
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“transflow” equipment,280 is defined as a facility that 
“accommodate[s] the transfer” of goods between transportation 
mediums.281 In this case, the crude offloading rack facilitates the 
“transflow” of crude from tank car to pipeline to refinery. The 
distance the crude will travel by pipeline is negligible,282 yet, even 
this seems to fit the definition and spirit of the ICC Termination 
Act.  
Moreover, Congress considered both intermodal and 
transloading equipment use and sought to incentivize and support 
both.283 In fact, Congress specifically noted its intention to “further 
foster” intermodal transportation and increase railroad 
competitiveness with other modes of transportation.284 
Importantly, Congress sought to “remove all existing restrictions 
that specifically limit or preclude intermodal . . . operations.”285 It 
is difficult to imagine a stronger statement in favor of facilities like 
crude offloading racks.  
The case law is no less determinative, regarding regulations 
impacting transloading and intermodal transportation as 
economic regulations. Courts have faced situations in which 
localities sought to regulate transloading facilities, and in some 
cases, struck these regulations down as preempted.286 For 
example, when courts have been presented with environmental 
                                                                                                     
at one or both ends.”).  
 280. See AM. ASS’N OF STATE HIGHWAY & TRANS. OFFICIALS, TRANSPORTATION: 
INVEST IN AMERICA 20, http://rail.transportation.org/Documents/FreightRailReport.pdf 
(“‘[T]ransflow’ facilities accommodate the transfer of liquid or ‘flowing’ materials 
(e.g., oils, plastics, pellets, bakery flour, etc.) from carload to truck using 
specialized pumping equipment.”).  
 281. Id.  
 282. See VALERO REFINING CO., VALERO CRUDE BY RAIL PROJECT DESCRIPTION, 
supra note 138, at 8 (proposing the addition of 4,000 feet of pipeline for the 
installation of a crude-by-rail offloading rack).  
 283. See supra Part III.E.2 (discussing the term “economic regulation” in the 
ICC Termination Act legislative history).  
 284. See supra notes 162–163 and accompanying text (providing insight into 
Congress’s thinking regarding the use and support of intermodal and 
transloading facilities). 
 285. Supra note 163 and accompanying text.  
 286. See supra Part IV.B (examining how economic regulation has been 
viewed in the case law).  
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regulations and safety regulations287 impacting transloading 
facilities, these were found to be preempted by the ICC 
Termination Act. Moreover, in Valero Refining Co., the STB 
suggests that offloading sites would likely constitute transloading 
facilities, but noted that these activities would be preempted only 
if performed by, or under the auspices of, a rail carrier.288  
For these reasons, the land-use permitting process for crude 
offloading facilities constitutes economic regulation. Both 
legislative history and jurisprudence strongly indicate the Act 
covers these kinds of facilities. Therefore, were a rail carrier, like 
Union Pacific, constructing this facility on its own land, the ICC 
Termination Act would undoubtedly preempt local permit denials 
for the construction of a crude offloading rack at the facility. 
However, under this circumstance, it is the refinery constructing 
the offloading facility, not the railroad. The refinery must be 
within the jurisdictional reach of the STB and be “transportation 
by rail carrier” to benefit from preemption.  
B. Refineries Are Not “Rail Carriers” and Should Not Be Covered 
by the ICC Termination Act 
The next question is whether a refinery could ever fall under 
STB jurisdiction. In other words, whether a refinery could be a 
“rail carrier” under any circumstance. There are two distinct 
scenarios under which this issue could arise. The first is similar to 
the one in Valero Refining Co., described above. Under this 
scenario, the refinery itself applies for the permit to build a crude-
by-rail offloading facility on its own land. In the second scenario—
one not explored directly in any case law—the refinery applies for 
a land-use permit as the railroad’s agent. In both circumstances, 
                                                                                                     
 287. See Green Mountain R.R. v. Vermont, 404 F.3d 638, 644 (2d Cir. 2005) 
(asserting that any distinction between economic and environmental regulation 
is “not useful”); Friberg v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 267 F.3d 439, 443 (5th Cir. 
2001) (determining that regulations specifying “the time a train can occupy a rail 
crossing impacts . . . the way a railroad operates its trains, with concomitant 
economic ramifications” and are therefore preempted).  
 288. Valero Refining Co.—Petition for Declaratory Order, FD 36036, slip op. 
at 4 (STB served Sept. 20, 2016).  
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law and public policy militate against preempting generally 
applicable land-use permitting processes in favor of crude-by-rail.  
1. Refineries Applying for Permits on Their Own Behalf Are Not 
“Rail Carriers,” and Local Permit Denials Are Not Preempted by 
the ICC Termination Act 
The first scenario under which this issue is relevant looks like 
the situation described in Valero Refining Co.289 As discussed 
above, Valero applied to the Benicia Planning Commission for a 
permit on its own behalf and never suggested it was “operating 
under the auspices of a rail carrier.”290  
The issue is whether a refinery petitioning to build a crude 
offloading facility should be considered “transportation by rail 
carrier” for the purposes of the ICC Termination Act. Because the 
terms “transportation” and “rail carrier” are defined separately 
under the Act,291 this issue contains two distinct inquiries: (1) 
whether the crude offloading facility is “transportation;” and (2) 
whether the refinery is a “rail carrier.” As discussed above, the 
offloading facility should be considered transportation.292 Under 
the ICC Termination Act, transportation includes 
“equipment . . . related to the movement of . . . property.”293 This 
includes intermodal and transloading facilities, and crude 
offloading is similar enough to both forms of transportation.294 
As discussed above, the definition of rail carrier is potentially 
quite broad.295 However, neither the legislative history, the STB, 
nor the federal courts have viewed it this way.296 In fact, central to 
                                                                                                     
 289. See id. slip op. at 2–3 (providing the background of the dispute between 
Valero and the city of Benicia).  
 290. Id. slip op. at 5.  
 291. Supra Part III.C.  
 292. See supra Part III.C (assessing the meaning of “transportation” in the 
ICC Termination Act).  
 293. 49 U.S.C. § 10102(9)(A).  
 294. See supra Part V.A (describing rail intermodal and transloading 
facilities).   
 295. Supra Part III.D (analyzing the terms “rail carrier” and “railroad” as 
used in the ICC Termination Act). 
 296. See supra Part III.E.3 & IV.C (discussing the legislative history and case 
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the STB’s decision in Valero Refining Co. is the fact that the 
Benicia Planning Commission denied “Valero’s off-loading 
facility,” not Union Pacific’s.297 Ultimately, generally applicable 
local land-use regulation is not railroad regulation, unless the 
party applying is a railroad. In this case, it is not. No courts have 
gone so far as to impose ICC Termination Act preemption over a 
facility not owned or operated by a railroad. In this specific 
situation, the refinery alone cannot be considered a “rail carrier,” 
and therefore, its land-use permit application is not subject to ICC 
Termination Act preemption.  
2. Refineries Applying for Permits as Agents of a Railroad Are Not 
“Rail Carriers,” and Local Permit Denials Are Not Preempted by 
the ICC Termination Act 
In Valero Refining Co., the STB suggests that, were Valero 
operating “under the auspices of a rail carrier,” the STB’s 
declaratory order denying jurisdiction might have had a different 
outcome.298 However, it is not so clear that the outcome should be 
different. First, the jurisprudence is mixed on this question.299 
Second, the legislative history does not suggest that “operating 
under the auspices of a rail carrier” was ever even considered.300 
On the other hand, the ICC Termination Act’s definition of “rail 
carrier,” read broadly, covers an “assignee or personal 
representative” of a rail carrier—referred to for convenience as an 
“agent” in this section—operating a facility “used or necessary for 
transportation.”301 The dichotomy between the practical and 
textual definition of “rail carrier” makes this scenario more 
complicated than the previous one.  
                                                                                                     
law surrounding the definition of “rail carrier” in the ICC Termination Act).  
 297. Valero Refining Co.—Petition for Declaratory Order, FD 36036, slip op. 
at 5 (S.T.B. served Sept. 20, 2016).  
 298. Id. (determining that the refinery made “no allegation that it is a rail 
carrier or that it would be performing offloading under the auspices of rail 
carrier”).  
 299. Supra Part IV.   
 300. Supra Part III.E.3.  
 301. See supra Part III.C (discussing the potentially expansive meaning of 
“rail carrier” in the ICC Termination Act).  
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Unlike the first scenario, refineries and railroads have yet to 
attempt to form an agency relationship for these purposes. The 
reasons for this are uncertain, but might be a function of two 
conditions. First, the refineries simply might not have thought 
they needed to worry about local permit denials. The Valero 
Refining Co. decision upholding Benicia’s land-use permit denial 
was unexpected, and most localities might have assumed they had 
little choice but to approve the offloading facility permits. Thus, 
there was no need for refineries to create a “work around.”  
Second, the agency arrangement is more complex in this 
situation than in others that courts have considered. As discussed 
above, while there are factors courts apply to determine whether 
an agent is operating “under the auspices of a rail carrier,” each 
factor is a circuitous attempt to determine the liability the railroad 
will be assuming.302 In this circumstance, rather than the railroads 
owning the land and leasing it to an agent, as is usually the case,303 
the railroad would presumably need to lease—or buy—the land 
from the refinery and contract with the refinery to perform 
offloading services. This makes the arrangement slightly more 
fraught and less desirable to the railroad.   
Contrary to the STB’s suggestion in Valero Refining Co.,304 an 
agency relationship, in and of itself, is not enough to preempt local 
land-use permitting authority. As discussed in subpart IV.C, 
courts look to a series of factors to determine whether an agent is 
“operating under the auspices of  rail carrier.”305 These factors 
involve investigating: (1) whether the railroad “holds out” the 
facility as part of its business; (2) the degree of control retained by 
the railroad; (3) which party has the obligation to maintain the 
                                                                                                     
 302. Supra note 270 and accompanying text.  
 303. See supra Part IV.C (evaluating cases involving third party non-carriers 
and agents of rail carriers).  
 304. See Valero Refining Co.—Petition for Declaratory Order, FD 36036, slip 
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 305. See Padgett v. Surface Transp. Bd., 804 F.3d 103, 108 (1st Cir. 2015) 
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property; (4) which party is liable for incidents occurring on the 
property; and (5) the finances of the facility.306  
In order to “hold out” a facility as being part of its business, 
the railroad is often expected to build the facility itself, own or 
lease the property, and advertise the property as its own service.307 
For example, in SEA-3,308 a city denied a transloading company’s 
(SEA-3) permit to expand its facility because it violated a city 
zoning ordinance.309 The STB held that the transloading company 
was not a rail carrier, and therefore, the ICC Termination Act did 
not preempt city’s permit denial.310 Importantly, the transloading 
company itself, not the railroad, “built, own[ed], control[led], 
insure[d], and advertise[d]” the facility.311  
Conversely, in City of Alexandria,312 the STB found that ICC 
Termination Act Preemption Clause “shielded [the ethanol 
transloading facility] from most state and local laws, including 
zoning laws.”313 The STB considered three determinative factors in 
its ruling. First, the railroad “own[s] the Facility and constructed 
it with [its] own funds.”314 Second, the license agreement between 
the railroad and transloader was not consistent with the 
transloader conducting its own independent business under the 
guise of a licensee-licensor relationship.315 Last, use of the 
transloading facility was offered as part of the railroad’s common 
                                                                                                     
 306. Id.  
 307. See N.Y. Susquehanna & W. Ry. Corp. v. Jackson, 500 F.3d 238, 250 (3d 
Cir. 2007) (noting the importance of the fact that “Susquehanna, by contracting 
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op. at 1 (S.T.B. served Feb. 17, 2009). 
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carrier service and bundled with the shipping services for ethanol 
producers.316  
As these cases demonstrate, the determinative factor is not 
about an “agency relationship” alone. Rather, the inquiry focuses 
on the amount of liability and ownership responsibility a railroad 
truly intends to take on regarding the operation of the facility. 
Presumably, this high bar recognizes that a facility must actually 
be conducting itself as an arm of the rail carrier, rather than as an 
independent firm in disguise.  
Given the status of the crude-by-rail industry, these 
requirements will be difficult for railroads to meet under any 
scenario. As discussed above, at this time, railroads do not invest 
in crude offloading facilities at all.317 Therefore, responsibility for 
building and maintaining them falls on refineries and crude oil 
producers exclusively. This would obviously need to change were 
railroads to make an agency-based argument.  
Furthermore, some sort of ownership or leasing arrangement 
of the property would likely be required. However, a short lease 
term would be nonsensical, as the only party benefiting from the 
crude offloading facility would be the one refinery in the vicinity. 
Who else would a railroad practically “lease” to? This would make 
any showing that the agent is not just an independent firm “in 
disguise” nearly impossible to make.  
With additional degrees of control come additional monetary 
obligations. The circumstance under which crude-by-rail is 
profitable are already narrow.318 These additional requirements 
may be so costly as to remove the economic incentive for railroads 
to transport the crude and refineries to receive it. Crude-by-rail is 
already a more expensive form of transportation than pipeline and 
tanker.319 Unless the resale price of oil or the price of foreign crude 
begins to rise dramatically, crude-by-rail will begin to lose its 
appeal even if it costs only slightly more.  
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For these reasons, the “agency theory” of preemption is not 
feasible for crude-by-rail projects. Therefore, localities should not 
be preempted from denying land-use permits to refineries, even if 
they are acting as agents of a railroad.  
VI. Conclusion 
Crude oil is a massive industry both in the United States, and 
across the world.320 Crude oil producers, refineries, and railroad 
companies all stand to gain considerably by the proliferation of 
domestic crude throughout the nation by rail car.321 Therefore, 
these moneyed interests will continue to pursue favorable 
preemption rulings in the courts. The consequences of such rulings 
would be immense. The crude-by-rail industry’s ability to preempt 
local regulations and land-use permit requirements would hang a 
metaphorical “open for business” sign on every community 
throughout the entire United States. If preempted, these sites 
could be built without any input from the very communities who 
will bear the environmental, safety, and economic downside of a 
crude-by-rail disaster.  
Under no situation should a refinery be considered 
“transportation by rail carrier” for the purposes of the ICC 
Termination Act. While Congress intended to draft a broadly 
applicable deregulatory measure, there is no indication it sought 
to allow non-rail firms to use railroad legislation as a pretextual 
cloak to conduct non-rail business with impunity. Even though this 
is the type of regulation Congress intended to preempt, this is not 
the type of party the Act was intended to cover. Refineries are not 
rail carriers under the meaning and subsequent interpretation of 
the Act, and it is difficult to imagine a situation where refineries 
could ever be operating “under the auspices” of a rail carrier to the 
satisfaction of jurisprudential standards. 
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